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Lemon1 Is a Lemon: 2 Toward a Rational Interpretation of
the Establishment Clause3
Thomas C. Marks, Jr.·
Michael Bertolini**
I. INTRODUCTION

This article will demonstrate the flaws in the three-part test
propounded by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman 4
for determining if an act of government violates the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Having
demonstrated Lemon's flaws, we will then suggest two alternatives to
Lemon. The first alternative is based upon the "incidental impact" test
from United States v. O'Brien, 5 as modified by Turner Broadcasting
System, Inc. v. F. C. C. 6 The second is the somewhat different incidental
impact test from Employment Division, Department of Human Resources
v. Smith. 7 The juxtaposition of these two tests can be seen by comparing
the plurality opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist with the opinion of
Justice Scalia, concurring only in the judgment, in Barnes v. Glen
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University (1960); LL.B. Stetson University College of Law (1963); Ph.D. University of Florida
(1971).
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December 1997; Member, Stetson Moot Court Board and Legal Writing Society. B.B.A.,
Oglethorpe University, 1988; Certified Public Accountant, Georgia.
The authors wish to thank the Faculty Support Services Staff at Stetson University College of
Law, with special thanks to Connie Evans, Barbara Lernihan and Louise Petren.
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2. "One that is unsatisfactory or defective." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGUSH LANGUAGE 1030 (3d ed. 1996).
3. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion ...." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
4. 403 u.s. 602 (1971).
5. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). This is a freedom of expression case.
6. 512 U.S. 622 (1994). This also is a freedom of expression case. Turner actually
recognizes the blending of the balancing test used in content-neutral time, place or manner
regulation of expression in a public forum with the O'Brien type of balancing of competing
interests when a law's impact on protected expression is merely incidental. See infra notes 71-76
and accompanying text.
7. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). This is a free exercise of religion case.

1

2

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 12

Theatre, Inc. 8 By applying these two tests to various acts of governmene
which trigger Establishment Clause concerns, we expect to demonstrate
that either is far superior to the Lemon test. It will ultimately be left to the
reader to determine which of the two alternatives is preferable, although
we will make our own suggestions in this article's conclusion.
II.

THE HOPELESSLY FLAWED LEMON TEST AND ITS PREDICTED DEMISE

Perhaps the beginning of the end of the Lemon tese 0 is found in
Justice Scalia's opinion, concurring only in the result, in Lamb's Chapel
v. Center Moriches Union Free School District:

8. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). This is a freedom of expression case.
9. The First Amendment of its own force applies only to the United States. Barron v.
Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833). The First Amendment does however, now
apply to the States and their local governments by way of incorporation into the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As to the Establishment Clause, see Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
10. Lemon, 403 U.S. 602. The test asked three questions.
Every analysis in [the Establishment Clause] area must begin with consideration
of the cumulative criteria developed by the Court over many years. Three such tests
may be gleaned from our cases. First, the statute must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its principle or primary effect must be one that neither advances
nor inhibit< religion, . . .; finally, the statute must not foster an "excessive
government entanglement with religion." [citation omitted.]
!d. at 612-613.
The entanglement issue can take one of two forms. First, in an attempt to insure that the
primary effect of a law does not advance religion, government monitoring of how the aid provided
to a school with religious affiliation is used may create impermissible entanglement.
The history of government grants of a continuing cash subsidy indicates that
such programs have almost always been accompanied by varying measures of
control and surveillance. The government cash grants before us now provide
no basis for predicting that comprehensive measures of surveillance and
controls will not follow. In particular the government's post-audit power to
inspect and evaluate the church-related school's financial records and to
determine which expenditures are religious and which are secular creates an
intimate and continuing relationship between church and state.
!d. at 621-622.
Also:
A broader base of entanglement of yet a different character is presented by
the divisive political potential of these state programs. In a community where
such a large number of pupils are served by church-related schools, it can be
assumed that state assistance will entail considerable political activity. Partisans
of parochial schools, understandably concerned with rising costs and sincerely
dedicated to both the religious and secular educational missions of their
schools, will inevitably champion this cause and promote political action to
achieve their goals. Those who oppose state aid, whether for constitutional,
religious, or fiscal reasons, will inevitably respond and employ all of the usual
political campaign techniques to prevail. Candidates will be forced to declare
and voters to choose. It would be unrealistic to ignore the fact that many
people confronted with issues of this kind will find their votes aligned with
their faith.
!d. at 622.
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As to the Court's invocation of the Lemon test: Like some
ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in
its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed
and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause
jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and
school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School
District. Its most recent burial, only last Term, was, to be
sure, not fully six-feet under: our decision in Lee v. Weisman
conspicuously avoided using the supposed "test" but also
declined the invitation to repudiate it. Over the years,
however, no fewer than five of the currently sitting Justices
have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through
the creature's heart (the author oftoday's opinion repeatedly),
and a sixth has joined an opinion doing so. 11

The place to begin understanding what is wrong with the Lemon test
is within the text of Chief Justice (then-Justice) Rehnquist's dissenting
opinion in Wallace v. Jaffree, 12 which can be divided into three parts.
First, Justice Rehnquist attempts (successfully, in our opinion) to
demolish the link between Thomas Jefferson's "wall of separation"
metaphor and the Establishment Clause. As Justice Rehnquist's dissent
points out: "It is impossible to build sound constitutional doctrine upon a
mistaken understanding of constitutional history, but unfortunately the
Establishment Clause has been expressly freighted with Jefferson's
misleading metaphor for nearly 40 years." 13
Justice Rehnquist then builds a convincing case that Jefferson's
apparently incidental reference to "a wall of separation" in his letter to
the Danbury [Virginia] Baptist Association14 did not represent (1) the
views of the architects of the First Amendment, nor (2) the original
understanding of the Establishment Clause. Both points can be
encapsulated into the following explanation:
It would seem from this evidence that the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment had acquired a well-accepted

11. 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (citations omitted).
12. 472 U.S. 38, 98-114 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist is one
of the six justices referred to by Justice Scalia in his opinion concurring in the judgment in Lamb's
Chapel. See infra text accompanying note 14.
13. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). It is useful to note that even in
Lemon itself, the opinion's author, Chief Justice Burger, cautioned that, "Judicial caveats against
entanglement must recognize that the line of separation, far from being a 'wall,' is a blurred,
indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship." 403
U.S. at 614.
14. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 92.

4

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 12

meaning: it forbade establishment of a national religion, and
forbade preference among religious sects or denominations.
Indeed, the first American dictionary defined the word
"establishment" as "the act of establishing, founding, ratifying
or ordaining," such as in "[t]he episcopal form of religion, so
called, in England." 1 N. Webster, American Dictionary of the
English Language (1st ed. 1828). The Establishment Clause
did not require government neutrality between religion and
irreligion nor did it prohibit the Federal Government from
providing nondiscriminatory aid to religion. There is simply no
historical foundation for the proposition that the Framers
intended to build the "wall of separation" that was
constitutionalized in Everson. 15

Not only was the Court's adoption of the wall of separation
influenced by bad history, it created bad law:
Whether due to its lack of historical support or its practical
unworkability, the Everson "wall" has proved all but useless
as a guide to sound constitutional adjudication. It illustrated
only too well the wisdom of Benjamin Cardozo's observation
that "[m]etaphors in law are to be narrowly watched, for
starting as devices to liberate thought, they end often by
enslaving it."
But the greatest injury of the "wall" notion is its
mischievous diversion ofjudges from the actual intentions of
the drafters ofthe Bill of Rights. The "crucible oflitigation,"is
well adapted to adjudicating factual disputes on the basis of
testimony presented in court, but no amount of repetition of
historical errors in judicial opinions can make the errors true.
The "wall of separation between church and State" is a
metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor which has proved
useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and
explicitly abandoned. 16

Finally, Justice Rehnquist turns to Lemon:
The Court has more recently attempted to add some mortar to
Everson's wall through the three-part test of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, which served at first to offer a more useful test for
purposes of the Establishment Clause than did the "wall"
metaphor. Generally stated, the Lemon test proscribes state

15. !d. at 106. "Everson" refers to Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
16. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 107 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).

001]

LEMON AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

5

action that has a sectarian purpose or effect, or causes an
impermissible governmental entanglement with religion.
Lemon cited Board of Education v. Allen as the source of
the "purpose" and "effect" prongs of the three-part test. The
Allen opinion explains, however, how it inherited the purpose
and effect elements from Schempp and Everson, both of which
contain the historical errors described above. Thus the
purpose and effect prongs have the same historical
deficiencies as the wall concept itself: they are in no way based
on either the language or intent of the drafters. 17

Having outlined the test, Justice Rehnquist then focuses more
carefully on Lemon's first and third prongs. The point made about the
first, or "secular purpose," prong is that if applied literally, it would
either be virtually no barrier to government violations of the
Establishment Clause, or it would preclude any aid to any organization
that is affiliated with a religion. Thus, at the one extreme:
If the purpose prong is intended to void those aids to sectarian
institutions accompanied by a stated legislative purpose to aid
religion, the prong will condemn nothing so long as the
legislature utters a secular purpose and says nothing about
aiding religion. Thus the constitutionality of a statute may
depend upon what the legislators put into the legislative
history and, more importantly, what they leave out. The
purpose prong means little if it only requires the legislature to
express any secular purpose and omit all sectarian references,
because legislators might do just that. 18

At the other extreme:
[I]f the purpose prong is aimed to void all statutes enacted
with the intent to aid sectarian institutions, whether stated or
not, then most statutes providing any aid, such as textbooks
or bus rides for sectarian school children, will fail because one
of the purposes behind every statute, whether stated or not, is
to aid the target of its largesse. In other words, if the purpose
prong requires an absence of any intent to aid sectarian
institutions, whether or not expressed, few state laws in this
area could pass the test, and we would be required to void
some state aids to religion which we have already upheld. 19

17. !d. at 108 (citations omitted).
18. /d.
19. /d. at 108-09. For an example of "state aids to religion which we have already upheld.'•
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Thus, Justice Rehnquist could conclude, with some force that, "[t]he
secular purpose prong has proved mercurial in application because it has
never been fully defined, and we have never fully stated how the test is to
operate.' '20
The third prong - the "Entanglement" prong - receives similarly
harsh treatment. Justice Rehnquist quite correctly points out that, without
"Walz' s reflective inquiry into entanglement'm, application of the
entanglement prong, there is a
[C]reat[ion of] an "insoluble paradox" in school aid cases: we
have required aid to parochial schools to be closely watched
lest it be put to sectarian use, yet this close supervision itself
will create an entanglement. For example, in Wolman the
Court in part struck the State's nondiscriminatory provision of
buses for parochial school field trips, because the state
supervision of sectarian officials in charge of field trips would
be too onerous. This type of self-defeating result is certainly
not required to ensure that States do not establish religions. 22

The Court's "insoluble paradox" reminds one of Joseph Heller's timeless
novel, Catch-22:
There was only one catch and that was Catch-22, which
specified that a concern for one's own safety in the face of
dangers that were real and immediate was the process of a
rational mind. Orr was crazy and could be grounded. All he
had to do was ask; and as soon as he did, he would no longer
be crazy and would have to fly more missions .... If he flew
them he was crazy and didn't have to; but if he didn't want to
he was sane and had to .... "That's some catch, that Catch22," [Yossarian] observed. "It's the best there is," Doc Deneeka
agreed. 23

Justice Rebnquist cited Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968), where the Court upheld
against an Establishment Clause challenge the loan by the State of secular textbooks to children
attending private schools with a religious affiliation. /d.
20. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 108 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
21. /d. at 109 (referring to Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970) (the source of
the entanglement prong)).
22. !d. at 109-10 (citations omitted).
23. JOSEPH HEUER, CATCH-22 (1961), quoted in BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOfATJONS 752
(16th ed. 1992). The Catch-22 analogy appears to have been used first by then-Justice Rehnquist
in his dissenting opinkn in Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v.
Felton_U.S._, 117 S. Ct. 1997 (1997). "In this case the Court takes advantage of the 'Catch22' paradox of its own creation, ... whereby aid [to religiously affiliated private schools] must
be supervised to ensure no entanglement but the supervision itself causes an entanglement."
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 420-21 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist refers to his dissenting
opinion in Wallace, where he commented upon the "insoluable paradox": "[W]e have required aid
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Not only does the paradox/Catch-22 conundrum exist, but the
entanglement part of the Lemon test

[A]lso ignores the myriad state administrative regulations
properly placed upon sectarian institutions such as
curriculum, attendance, and certification requirements for
sectarian schools, or fire and safety regulations for churches.
Avoiding entanglement between church and State may be an
important consideration in a case like Walz, but if the
entanglement prong were applied to all state and church
relations in the automatic manner in which it has been
applied to school aid cases, the State could hardly require
anything of church-related institutions as a condition for
receipt of financial assistance. 24
Even without substantive reference to the second, primary effect, prong
of Lemon, 25 Justice Rehnquist states quite accurately the cause-and-effect
of the Lemon test:

These difficulties arise because the Lemon test has no more
grounding in the history of the First Amendment than does
the wall theory upon which it rests. The three-part test
represents a determined effort to craft a workable rule from a
historically faulty doctrine; but the rule can only be as sound
as the doctrine it attempts to service. The three-part test has
simply not provided adequate standards for deciding
Establishment Clause cases, as this Court has slowly come to
realize. Even worse, the Lemon test has caused this Court to
fracture into unworkable plurality opinions depending upon
how each of the three factors applies to a certain state action.
The results from our school services cases show the difficulty
we have encountered in making the Lemon test yield
principled results. 26
Justice Rehnquist' s closing thoughts on the Lemon test are ideally not
merely a description of the Court's declining admiration for it, but
hopefully are prophetic, as well:

to parochial schools to be closely watched lest it be put to sectarian use. yet this close supervision
itself will create an entanglement." Wallace, 412 U.S. at 109 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting (citing
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 768-69)). As Justice White so cogently put it in Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S.
589 (1988), "[T]his litigation presents us with yet another 'Catch-22' argument: the very
supervision of the aid to assure that it does not further religion renders the statute invalid." Bowen,
487 U.S. at 615 (White, J., dissenting (citing Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 421)).
24. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
25. It is this second prong that to us seems the most result-oriented.
26. Wallace, 412 U.S. at 110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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Although the test initially provided helpful assistance, we
soon began describing the test as only a "guideline," and lately
we have described it as "no more than [a] useful signpos[t]."
We have noted that the Lemon test is "not easily applied,"and
as JUSTICE WHITE noted in Committee for Public Education &
Religious Educ. v. Regan, under the Lemon test we have
"sacrifice[d] clarity and predictability for flexibility." 444 U.S.
at 662. In Lynch we reiterated that the Lemon test has never
been binding on the Court, and we cited two cases where we
had declined to apply it.
If a constitutional theory has no basis in the history of the
amendment it seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and
yields unprincipled results, I see little use in it. The "crucible
of litigation[]" has produced only consistent unpredictability,
and to day's effort is just a continuation of "the sisyphean task
of trying to patch together the 'blurred, indistinct and variable
barrier' described in Lemon v. Kurtzman. "We have done much
straining since 1947, but still we admit that we can only
"dimly perceive" the Everson wall. Our perception has been
clouded not by the Constitution but by the mists of an
unnecessary metaphor. 27
Justice Rehnquist is only one of the "five ... currently sitting Justices
[whoj have, in their own opinions, personally driven pencils through the
creature's heart .... " 28 Of course, Justice Scalia must count himself. The
other three are Justices White, O'Connor, and Kennedy. 29 In addition, as
pointed out by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas must be added to the list
because he similarly joined in an opinion that "dr[ove] a pencil through
the creature's heart. "30
Justice White, as noted by Justice Scalia, has repeatedly driven those
same metaphoric pencils through the creature's heart. 31 Justice White's
discontent with Leman is evidenced in a separate opinion he authored in
that case, and it is in large part based on the Catch-22 paradox noted
earJier: 32

[T]he majority then interposes findings and conclusions that
the District Court expressly abjured, namely, that nuns,

27.
2ll.
29.
30.
31.
32.

!d. at 112 (ci<ations omitted).
Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
See id. at 398-99.
See id. at 398.
See id. at 398-99.
Sf'e supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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clerics, and dedicated Catholic laymen unavoidably pose a
grave risk in that they might not be able to put aside their
religion in the secular classroom. Although stopping short of
considering them untrustworthy, the Court concludes that for
them the difficulties of avoiding teaching religion along with
secular subjects would pose intolerable risks and would in any
event entail an unacceptable enforcement regime. Thus, the
potential for impermissible fostering of religion in secular
classrooms-an untested assumption of the Courtparadoxically renders unacceptable the State's efforts at
insuring that secular teachers under religious discipline
successfully avoid conflicts between the religious mission of
the school and the secular purpose of the State's education
program.

The Court thus creates an insoluble paradox for the State and
the parochial schools. The State cannot finance secular
instruction if it permits religion to be taught in the same
classroom; but if it exacts a promise that religion not be so
taught-a promise the school and its teachers are quite willing
and on this record able to give-and enforces it, it is then
entangled in the "no entanglement" aspect of the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence. 33

Justice White's unhappiness with Lemon continues quietly enough in
Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist: "I am
quite unreconciled to the Court's decision in Lemon v. Kurtzman. I
thought then, and I think now, that the Court's conclusion there was not
required by the First Amendment and is contrary to the long-range
interests of the country." 34 Again in Roemer v. Board of Public Works,
White expresses his discontent as follows: "The threefold test of Lemon I
imposes unnecessary, and, as I believe today's plurality opinion
demonstrates, superfluous tests for establishing 'when the State's
involvement with religion passes the peril point' for First Amendment
purposes. " 35 As in his Nyquist dissent, 36 Justice White again finds
particular fault with the Entanglement prong of the Lemon test in New
York v. Cathedral Academy:

33. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 666-668 (White, J., concurring in the judgments in two cases, and
dissenting in two others).
34. 413 U.S. 756, 820 (1973) (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
35. Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., dissenting)
(quoting Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 822 (White, J., dissenting)).
36. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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Because the Court continues to misconstrue the First
Amendment in a manner that discriminates against religion
and is contrary to the fundamental educational needs of the
country, I dissent here as I have in Lemon v. Kurtzman;
Committee for Public Education v. Nyquist; Levitt v.
Committee for Public Education; Meek v. Pittenger; and
Wolman v. Walter. 37

Widmar v. Vincenf 8 contains little more than a reference to Justice
White's opinions in Lemon39 and Nyquist. 40 The same can be said of
Justice White's combined dissent in School District of Grand Rapids v.
Ball; 41 Aguilar v. Felton; 42 Secretary, United States Department of
Education v. Felton; 43 and Chancellor of the Board of Education v.
Felton. 44
Justice Scalia's basis for including Justice O'Connor among the
"Lemon-acides" is due to her concurring opinion in Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos. 45 Justice O'Connor's opinion is based on little more than
complaints that the first (secular purpose) and the second (primary
effects) prongs of Lemon are imbalanced- either proving too little or too
much:
Although I agree with the judgment of the Court, I write
separately to note that this action once again illustrates
certain difficulties inherent in the Court's use of the test
articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman. As a result of this
problematic analysis, while the holding of the opinion for the
Court extends only to nonprofit organizations, its reasoning
fails to acknowledge that the amended§ 702, 42 USC§ 2000e1, raises different questions as it is applied to profit and
nonprofit organizations.

37. 434 U.S. 125, 134-35 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
38. 454 u.s. 263 (1981).
39. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
40. See supra text accompanying notes 34-35.
41. 473 u.s. 373 (1985).
42. 473 u.s. 402.
43. 473 u.s. 402 (1985).
44. 473 U.S. 402 (1985). One could add to this list, Levitt v. Committee for Public
Education and Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 482 (1973) (White, J., dissenting without op.),
Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349, 387 (1975) (Rehnquist, J., concuring in part, and dissenting in
part; joined by White, J.) and Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 255 (1977) (White and Rehnquist,
JJ ., concurring in part and dissenting in part for reasons stated in Rehnquist' s separate opinioin
in Meek v. Pittinger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) and in Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, White, J., dissenting).
45. 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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In Wallace v. Jaffree, I noted a tension in the Court's use
of the Lemon test to evaluate an Establishment Clause
challenge to government efforts to accommodate the free
exercise of religion:
On the one hand, a rigid application of the Lemon test
would invalidate legislation exempting religious
observers from generally applicable government
obligations. By definition, such legislation has a
religious purpose and effect in promoting the free
exercise of religion. On the other hand, judicial
deference to all legislation that purports to facilitate
the free exercise of religion would completely vitiate
the Establishment Clause. Any statute pertaining to
religion can be viewed as an 'accommodation' of free
exercise rights. 46
The basis for Justice Scalia's inclusion of Justice Kennedy among the
six is it follows his tepid critique of Lemon in Allegheny v. American
Civil Liberties Union, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter:
In keeping with the usual fashion of recent years, the majority
applies the Lemon test to judge the constitutionality of the
holiday displays here in question. I am content for present
purposes to remain within the Lemon framework, but do not
wish to be seen as advocating, let alone adopting, that test as
our primary guide in this difficult area. Persuasive criticism of
Lemon has emerged. Our cases often question its utility in
providing concrete answers to Establishment Clause
questions, calling it but a
'helpful signpost[t]'" or
'guidelin[e]' ", to assist our deliberations rather than a
comprehensive test. ( [W]e have repeatedly emphasized our
unwillingness to be confined to any single test or criterion in
this sensitive area"). Substantial revision of our
Establishment Clause doctrine may be in order; but it is
unnecessary to undertake that task today, for even the Lemon
test, when applied with proper sensitivity to our traditions
and our case law, supports the conclusion that both the creche
and the menorah are permissible displays in the context of the
holiday season. 47
II

11

11

46. Id. at 346-47 (quoting Wallace, 472 U.S. at 82) (citations omitted).
47. 492 U.S. 573, 655-56 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting
in part) (citations omitted).
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Finally, Justice Thomas rounds out the sextet, based upon his
concurrence with a Scalia dissent containing the following condemnation
of Lemon:
Our Religion Clause jurisprudence has become bedeviled (so to
speak) by reliance on formulaic abstractions that are not
derived from, but positively conflict with, our long-accepted
constitutional traditions. Foremost among these has been the
so-called Lemon test, which has received well-earned criticism
from many members of this Court. The Court today
demonstrates the irrelevance of Lemon by essentially ignoring
it, and the interment of that case may be the one happy
byproduct of the Court's otherwise lamentable decision.
Unfortunately, however, the Court has replaced Lemon with
its psycho-coercion test, which suffers the double disability of
having no roots whatever in our people's historic practice, and
being as infinitely expandable as the reasons for
psychotherapy itself. 48

Of course, the prediction of the demise of the Lemon test may be, as
were certain reports of Mark Twain's death, 49 greatly exaggerated. Justice
White's majority response in Lamb's Chapel to the Scalia opinion,
portraying Lemon as the monster that cannot die, 50 would certainly
suggest that, for the present at least, Scalia's description of Lemon may
be correct. Justice White declared:
While we are somewhat diverted by JUSTICE SCALIA's evening at the
cinema, ... we return to the reality that there is a proper way to inter
an established decision and Lemon, however frightening it might be
to some, has not been overruled. This case, like Corporation of
Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints
v. Amos, presents no occasion to do so. JUSTICE ScALIA apparently
was less haunted by the ghosts of the living when he joined the
opinion of the court in that case. 51
Nevertheless, there can be little doubt that Lemon has been
significantly damaged. It would thus appear appropriate to consider an
alternative to the three-part Lemon test based upon part of the Court's

48. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 644 (1992) (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citations omitted).
49. "The reports of my death are greatly exaggerated." Cable from Europe to the Associate
Press as reproduced in BARTLET'S FAMILIAR QUOfATIONS, note 616 (12th ed., 1951).
50. See supra text accompanying note 11.
51. Lamb's Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395, n.7 (citations omitted).
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freedom-of-expression
jurisprudence.
Equally
appropriate
for
consideration is a second alternative, based on a formulation created by
Justice Scalia for the other religion clause.

III.

PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE TESTS

Both of our proposed alternatives are predicated upon the concept of
a law that does not target a particular constitutional guarantee but, rather,
is aimed at some other goal. The law in question does, however, have an
incidental impact upon the constitutional guarantee.
A

The O'Brien-Turner Incidental Impact Test

The first approach apparently began with the Supreme Court's
opinion in United States v. 0 'Brien. 52 Petitioner O'Brien burned his draft
card as a symbolic protest against the United States' involvement in the
Vietnam War. 53 He was prosecuted by the Untied States because federal
law forbade such an action. 54 O'Brien claimed that his symbolic
expression in burning his draft card was protected by the First
Amendment. 55 The Court expressed reluctance to characterize the burning
of the draft card as speech, but even assuming arguendo that the
characterization was a propos, the effect of the federal law effect upon it
was no more than mere happenstance:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless
variety of conduct can be labeled "speech" whenever the
person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea . . . . This Court has held that when "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements are combined in the same court of
conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in
regulating the nonspeech element can justifY incidental
limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the
quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the
Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling;

52. 391 U.S. 367 (1968). None of the cases cited by the Court at notes 22-27 of its opinion
appear to involve diminished constitutional scrutiny based upon an incidental, rather than a direct,
impact upon a First Amendment freedom. For example, it could be argued that in NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963), Virginia's aim was to prevent solicitation of clients by lawyers and
that it had only an indirect or incidental impact on the similar, but protected, activities of the
NAACP in organizing litigation to attack racial discrimination. The Court did not appear to treat
the case that way. Indeed, it is cited by the 0 'Brien opinion to illustrate, along with the other cited
cases, that the Court's language in describing the gravity of purpose necessary for government to
withstand a First Amendment Challenge has not always been consistent. That is certainly true.
53. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 369, 376.
54. See id. at 370.
55. See id. at 376.
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substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong.
Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear
that a government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 1965
Amendment to § 12 (b) (3) of the Universal Military Training
and Service Act meets all of these requirements, and
consequently that O'Brien can be constitutionally convicted
for violating it. 56
The Court described the primary purpose of the law O'Brien was
charged with violating as follows:
The issuance of certificates in indicating the registration and
eligibility classification of individuals is a legitimate and
substantial administrative aid in the functioning of this
system. And legislation to insure the continuing availability of
issued certificates serves a legitimate and substantial purpose
in the system's administration. 57
It logically follows then that the impact of the law upon O'Brien's
symbolic speech was incidental to the law's primary purpose. This
justified the somewhat-reduced scrutiny enumerated by the Court. 5 8 There
is, however, a serious question as to just how reduced the scrutiny
actually was. Assuming, as did the Court, that burning one's draft card is
speech, 59 and that the government prohibition was content-based (which
it clearly was), the constitutional standard normally applied is strict
scrutiny. The conclusion of an appropriate measure of scrutiny is
accomplished through a determination of the existence of a compelling
governmental interest and necessity of means which will achieve the
government's purpose when a means with a lesser impact on speech does
not exist. "For the [government] to enforce a content-based exclusion it
must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling
[governmental] interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that

56. !d. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
57. !d. at 377-78.
58. See supra text accompanying note 56.
59. There can now be little doubt that it is. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397
(1989) (burning the American flag as a form of protest was deemed to be speech).
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end."60 The Court's reduced scrutiny in O'Brien appears to affect only the
requisite gravity of the government's purpose - "compelling" is
effectively reduced to merely "important."61 However, when the Court
described the means allowed as "no greater than is essential to the
furtherance of that [important purpose]"62 it was simultaneously
describing the "no less drastic means available" test: "We perceive no
alternative means that would more precisely and narrowly assure the
continuing availability of issued Selective Service certificates [draft
cards] than a law which prohibits their wilful mutilation or destruction."63
The O'Brien Court's reference to Sherbert v. Verner solidifies this
point. 64
It presently appears that the Court has further reduced the level of
scrutiny in 0 'Brien-type cases. In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v.
F. C. C., 65 it did this by merging, for purposes of the balancing tests, the
"incidental impact" cases like 0 'Brien with the content-neutral time,
place, or manner limitations in a public forum. The Court did so by
describing an "intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to content-neutral
restrictions that impose an incidental burden on speech." The Court
additionally cited 0 'Brien and Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 66 the latter
of which is clearly a content-neutral time, place, manner regulation
case. 67 The Court in Ward clearly stated that in the context of contentneutral time, place, manner limitations in a public forum, the phrase
"narrowly tailored" did not mean that the existence of less drastic means
must be explored. 68 If it had not been clear before, it was readily apparent
that the same modification had been made to the 0 'Brien test. 69
60. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educator's Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (citing
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461 (1980)).
61. See supra text accompanying note 56. That the Court does not always consult a
thesaurus when using terms such as this is evidenced by the Court's admission in O'Brien itself
that "to characterize the quality of the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has
employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent;
strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms." 391 U.S. at 376-77 (footnotes omitted).
62. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
63. !d. at 381 (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-408 (1963)).
64. "[l]t would plainly be incumbent upon the [government] to demonstrate that no
alternative forms of regulation would [achieve the government's purpose] without infringing First
Amendment rights." Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407.
65. 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
66. 491 u.s. 781 (1989).
67. It involved a content-neutral regulation of the noise level at a bandshell in New York
City's Central Park. See id. at 784.
68. In other contexts "narrowly tailored" can mean that there must be no less drastic means.
See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), referred to in Ward, 491 U.S. at 798, note 6.
69. After stating that "the O'Brien test 'in the last analysis is little, if any, different from
the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions,' " the Ward Court continued:
Lest any confusion on the point remain, we reaffirm today that a regulation of
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Adopting the reasoning from O'Brien, Ward, and Turner (the
O'Brien-Turner incidental impact test), is then the first proposed
alternative to the Lemon test. If government assistance to or in support of
religion is based upon a valid purpose unrelated to religion, that purpose
must be important or substantial, but not necessarily compelling.
Furthermore, the means which have an incidental positive 0 impact on
religion must be such that the purpose would be served less effectively
absent their use. The incidental positive impact on religion must not be
substantially more than is needed to achieve the government's purpose.

the time, place, or manner of protected speech must be narrowly tailored to
serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it need not
be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the
requirement of narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the . . . regulation
promotes a substantial government interest that would be achieved less
effectively absent the regulatiOn. . . . " To be sure, this standard does not mean
that a time, place, or manner regulation may burden substantially more speech
than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests. Government
rna y not regulate expression in such a manner that a substantial portion of the
burden on speech does not serve to advance its goals. See Frisby v. Schultz,
487 U.S., at 485, 108 S. a., at 2502 ("A complete ban can he narrowly
tailored but only if each activity within the prc,~cription's scope is an
appropriately targeted evil"). So long as the means chosen are not substantially
broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest, however, the
regulation will not be invalid simply because a court concludes that the
government's interest could be adequately served by some less-speech-restrictive
alternative. "The validity of [time, place, or manner] regulations does not turn
on a judge's agreement with the responsible decision-maker concerning the
most appropriate method for promoting significant government interest•" or the
degree to which those interests should be promoted.
Ward, 491 U.S. at 798-800 (footnotes omitted).
This, then, is what the Court meant in Turner when it said:
Under O'Brien, a content-neutral regulation will be sustained if
"it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest." !d., at 377, 88 S. Ct., at
1679.
To satisfy this standard, a regulation need not be the least speech-restrictive means of
advancing the Government's interests. "Rather, the requirement of narrow tailoring is
satisfied 'so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government interest that
would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation.'" Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at
799, 109 S. a., at 2758 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 105
S. Ct. 2897, 2906, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536 (1985)). Narrow tailoring in this context requires,
in other words, that the means chosen do not "burden substantially more speech than
is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." Ward, supra, 491 U.S. at
799, 109 S. Ct., at 2758.
Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2469.
70. A negative impact would implicate not the Establishment Clause but the Free Exercise
Clause.
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B. The Smith Neutrality Test
The second approach also requires that any benefit to religion be
incidental to some valid purpose unrelated to religion, but its treatment of
means which accomplish that end is quite different from the 0 'BrienTurner incidental impact test. Employment Division, Department of
Human Resources v. Smith71 is illustrative of this approach. The Smith
Court held that there was no Free Exercise right to the sacramental use of
peyote in the face of a general prohibition on its possession or use. 72 In so
holding, the Court did not use the O'Brien73 analysis but simply held that
a law which is generally applicable to society at large and not directed at
the free exercise of religion does not violate the First Amendment. Cases
such as Murdock v. Pennsylvania74 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 75 which
appear to hold otherwise, are explained as "involv[ing] not the Free
Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with
other constitutional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the
press or the right of parents to direct the education of their children. "76
Also limited to their facts were cases similar to Sherbert v. Verner, which
struck down a state's denial of unemployment compensation when the
recipient could not be employed because of religious scruples. 77 With
these few exceptions, the Court has apparently adopted the rule
announced in Minersville School District v. Gobitis:
Conscientious scruples have not, in the course of the long
struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or
restriction of religious beliefs. The mere possession of religious
convictions which contradict the relevant concerns of a

71. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
72. See id.
73. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
74. 319 U.S. 105 (1943). This case "invalidat[ed] a flat tax on solicitation as applied to
dissemination of religious ideas." Smith, 494 U.S. at 881.
75. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). This case "invalidat[ed] compulsory school-attendance laws as
awlied to Amish parents who refused on religious grounds to send their children to school." Smith,
494 U.S. at 881.
76. Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (citations omitted).
77. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
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political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge
of political responsibilities. 78

C. The O'Brien-Turner Incidental Impact Test & The Smith Neutrality
Test: A Comparison
The Smith approach can be compared with the O'Brien-Turner
incidental-impact approach79 by comparing the plurality opinion in
Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 80 with Justice Scalia's opinion in the same
case, concurring only in the judgment. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the plurality, applied the O'Brien-Turner "incidental impact"
approach to allow Indiana to proscribe non-obscene nude dancing
through the application to it of a broad public indecency statute which
proscribed public nudity generally. The plurality declared, "[t]he
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but
public nudity." 81 In so stating, the plurality drew a direct parallel to
0 'Brien. The expressive burning of the draft card and the expressive
nature of the nude dancing are equated, as are the laws prohibiting
burning or mutilation of draft cards and public nudity. Thus, the plurality
effectively applied the O'Brien test to the nude dancing. 82 Of major
importance in the plurality opinion is the plurality's finding that the
second part of the 0 'Brien test is satisfied by the public indecency statue
by furthering "a substantial government interest in protecting [societal
order] and morality." 83 Such a finding bolsters the application of the
police power to protect public morality even when it infringes, albeit
indirectly, on expression protected to at least some extent by the First
Amendment.
Justice Scalia's view is in sharp contrast to that of the plurality. His
displeasure with the plurality's position is evident:
In my view ... the challenged regulation must be upheld, not
because it survives some lower level of First-Amendment
scrutiny [as the plurality had held], but because, as a general

78. 310 U.S. 586, 595-95 (1940), overruled by Board of Educ. v. Barnett, 319 U.S. 624
(1943) (overruled on mixed expression and freedom of religion grounds). The Smith Court has also
quoted this language from Gobitis. It should be noted that Congress by legislation restored the
status quo ante when it enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000b.
Tills was, however, declared unconstitutional by the Court in Boerne v. Flores, _ U.S. _ , 117
S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
79. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
80. 501 u.s. 560 (1991).
81. !d. at 571.
82. See id. at 566-72.
83. !d. at 569.
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law regulating conduct and not specifically directed at
expression, it is not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at
all.B4

In other words, Justice Scalia would hold that a law generally regulating
conduct which coincidentally impacts on expression would not be
measured against the First Amendment at all, unless it could be shown
that the intent of the law was plainly directed at expression. After all,
Justice Scalia points out, the Court had already adopted just such an
approach in a free exercise of religion case, Employment Division,
Department of Human Resources v. Smith. 85
IV.

THE APPLICATION OF THE TESTS

The Establishment Clause cases can be classified into two basic
categories: (1) financial, 86 and (2) non-financial assistance to religion. 87
Financial cases can be further separated into public funding of private
universities on one hand and of secondary and elementary schools having
a religious affiliation on the other. Most of the non-financial assistance
Establishment Clause cases fall into the realm of religious symbolism and
prayer in public schools.
We will start our analysis of the effect the "neutrality" and
"incidental-impact" tests would have with the financial assistance cases
dealing with public funding or support of universities, and of secondary
and elementary schools having a religious affiliation. In each instance, we
will first consider our adaptation of the Smith neutrality test, as it is the
less complex of the two. We will then consider the O'Brien-Turner
incidental impact analysis or, rather, our adaptation of it. The Lemon test
has yielded different results in the case of a university versus a secondary
or elementary school. 88 The Court's rulings on public funding of

84. !d. at 572 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
85. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
86. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of
Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Bd. of Educ. of Central School District No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236
(1968); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971); Comm. For Public Educ. & Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Levitt v. Comm. for
Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973); Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1973);
Meeks v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975); Roemer v. Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976);
Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983); Aquilar v. Felton,
473 U.S. 402 (1985); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986);
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993).
87. See Engel v. Vitate, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); see also Sch. Dist. of Abington Township
Penn. v. Gchepp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Larken v. Grendel's Den, 459 U.S. 116 (1982); Estate of
Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
88. See Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 746 (1973) (stating that within religion-based
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universities under the Lemon test at times have closely resembled a
nuetrality or incidental-impact analysis and at times have been quite
different.

A

Private Universities with a Religious Affiliation

In Hunt v. McNair, the State of South Carolina created an Education
Facilities Authority which the State authorized to issue revenue bonds for
the benefit89 of all universities or colleges within the State. 90 The State
created the bonds so investors could receive the tax-free interest income
and the institution would pay a lower interest rate. 91 In return for the
revenue bond proceeds, the institution would create a saleslleaseback92
but the institution would remain the only party liable to the investors. 93
As per the requirements of the bonds, the institution could only use the
proceeds from the bonds on projects which were wholly secular. 94
The Supreme Court used the Lemon test to hold that the revenue
bonds did not violate the Establishment Clause. 95 The frrst element of the
Lemon test relates to the secular purpose of the legislation. 96 South
Carolina explicitly stated that institutions receiving revenue bond funds
could not use the funds for sectarian projects. 97 The Supreme Court held
the purpose of the statute to be secular because the benefits available
under the program were available to all universities, not simply
universities with a religious affiliation. 98 The second element of the

schools, religious indoctrination is not a significant portion of a university's teaching, whereas in
secondary and elementary schools, religion permeates the teaching).
89. The Supreme Court defined the "state aid" in the Hunt case as merely a conduit. /d.
at 745, n.7. The State made no expenditures on behalf of the program, nor did the State's funds
finance any portion of the Authority's budget. See id. Thus, the State's involvement with the
financial portion of the transaction was limited, "merely ... a 'governmental service.' " /d.
90. See id. at 736. The institutions could use the bonds for construction, financing or
refinancing of projects defined as facilities for education. See id.
91. See id. at 738-39.
92. A sales/leaseback is where the institution would use the proceeds of the bonds to
complete the project and sell the finished project to the Authority. See id. at 738. The Authority
would then lease the building to the institution and use the proceeds to pay-off the bonds. See id.
As the bonds were retired the project would revert to the institution. See id.
93. See id. at 738-39.
94. Id. at 74344. The Court looked to Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), to define
"secular'' in a university setting as one which '"shall not include' any buildings or facilities used
for religious purposes." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 744. However, the Court made the presumption that
lacking any evidence to the contrary, the projects are presumed to be used for secular purposes.
See id.
95. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 748-49.
96. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also supra note 10 for a description of the first
element of the Lemon test.
97. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741.
98. See id.
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Lemon test was the effect the legislation had upon advancing religion. 99
In Hunt, the State could evaluate individual projects and by that eliminate
any possible sectarian creation or usage of a project financed with
revenue bonds. 100 The Court stated this was sufficient to establish that the
primary effect of the statute was to benefit the citizens of the State and
not to benefit religion. 101
The most important analysis within Hunt apparently surrounded the
State's involvement with the transactions. 102 The financial entanglement
was limited, 103 so the Court reviewed the Authority's power over the
institution's use of the project. 104 The Authority could adjust rent as
necessary and establish the rules and regulations for the use of the
project. 105 Thus, the Court entered the gray area of entanglement between
State and religion, but in Hunt the Court ruled that this type of
entanglement was insignificant. 106 The Court stated that the powers were
sweeping and that if there were a realistic likelihood of them being fully
exercised, the entanglement problem would no longer be insignificant. 107
The Smith neutrality test, 108 if applied to Hunt, would arrive at the
same conclusion, but through a much simpler analysis. The neutrality
test, as modified for our purposes, asks one primary question: is the law
based upon some valid purpose unrelated to religion and is it equally
applicable to all? 109
In Hunt, the neutrality test would ask the one primary question based
upon the established facts within the case. The statute which created the
Authority was equal for all, since any university or college which desired
the benefit of the revenue bonds need only apply. 110 The legislature did
not discriminate against a university based upon its affiliations. 111 A~
stated in Smith, "'valid and neutral law[s] of general applicability'" do
not violate the Free Exercise Clause. 112 The statute was neutral to all
parties, whether public, private, or religious, and consequently cleared the

99. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also supra note 10 for a description of the second
Lemon test.
100. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 743.
101. See id.
I 02. See id. See supra note 92 for a description of the financial arrangements.
103. See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.
104. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 747.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See id. The Court did not think there was such a likelihood. See id. at 748-49.
108. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
109. See supra text accompanying note 84
110. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741.
111. See id. at 741-42.
112. Smith, 494 U.S. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982)
(Stevens, J., concurring in judgment)).
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first hurdle of the neutrality test. Therefore, under our adaptation of the
Smith rule, the statute would not even be subject to Establishment Clause
scrutiny. 113
Applying the O'Brien-Turner incidental impact test would require
asking whether the law was based upon some valid purpose unrelated to
religion, and also have only an incidental effect on Establishment Clause
concerns. The initial inquiry is then quite similar to that in the Smith
neutrality test. South Carolina created the Authority to assist in the
financing of capital projects within the State's universities and
colleges. 114 In addition, the State and Authority had no financial stake in
the transaction. The Authority merely established the rent payable; and
the rules and regulations as to the use of the project, as defined within the
statute, and contained on the revenue bonds. 115 The State's legislation
was thus based on a valid purpose unrelated to religion, and would
consequently have only an incidental effect on religion.
Once the mere incidental impact is established, unlike the Smith
neutrality test, the O'Brien-Turner approach then queries whether the law
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. 116 This form of
revenue bond aid to higher education can easily be characterized as just
such a governmental interest. One merely needs to read the declaration of
purpose of the South Carolina Legislature, which the Supreme Court
found, if only by indirection, 117 to be a good faith statement of the
purpose:
It is hereby declared that for the benefit of the people of the
State, the increase of their commerce, welfare and prosperity
and the improvement of their health and living conditions it is
essential that this and future generations of youth be given
the fullest opportunity to learn and to develop their
intellectual and mental capacities; that it is essential that
institutions for higher education within the State be provided
with appropriate additional means to assist such youth in
achieving the required levels of learning and development of
their intellectual and mental capacities; and that it is the
purpose of this chapter to provide a measure of assistance and
an alternative method to enable institutions for higher
education in the State to provide the facilities and structures

113. See supra text accompanying note 84.
114. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741-42.
115. See id. at 746-48.
116. See supra note 69.
117. "While a legislature's declaration of purpose may not always be a fair guide to its true
intent, appellant makes no suggestion that the introductory paragraph of the Act represents anything
other than a good-faith statement of purpose." Hunt, 413 U.S. at 741.
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which are sorely needed to accomplish the purposes of this
chapter, all to the public benefit and good, to the extent and
manner provided herein. 118
Finally, it must be determined if the "substantial government
interest ... would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation" and
does not involve "substantially more [Establishment Clause concerns]
than [are] necessary to further the government's legitimate interests." 119
Here, as with the requisite gravity of the purpose, the answer is
simple. Obviously, the goal of furthering all secular higher education
would be "achieved less effectively" if not all institutions of higher
learning could be included in this type of revenue bond aid. In addition,
substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns were involved than
were necessary because the revenue derived from the sale of the bonds
could be used to further only the secular aspects of the particular college
or university. 120 Thus, under the incidental-impact test, the revenue bonds
would plainly not violate the Establishment Clause.
The financing cases dealing with public funding of private and
religious universities become perhaps more complex when the State
actually pays the institutions from public funds. 121 In Roemer v. Board of
Public Works, Maryland created a statute to subsidize all the private
universities of higher learning within the State. 122 Maryland's statute
allowed for subsidies to all private universities, except universities which
granted solely religious degrees. The universities could use these funds
only for secular activities. 123 The State gave the Board of Public Works
the authority to insure the grants were used only for secular activities. 124
The Board of Public Works employed various methods to insure
compliance: Affidavits from the universities, utilization reports, and
audits of the institutions' use of the grant money. 125 Again the Court used
the Lemon test to establish that the grants did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 126

118. ld. at 741-742 (citation omitted).
119. Supra note 69.
120. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
121. The difference is between non-recourse revenue bond financing and direct grants of
public monies.
122. 426 U.S. at 740.
123. See id. at 74041. The statute stated "none of the moneys payable under this subtitle
shall be utilized by the institutions for sectarian purposes." Md. Ann. Code Ant. 77 A, §68A
(1975).
124. See id. at 74243.
125. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 736-37.
126. See id. at 766-67.
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Maryland's statute easily passed the frrst two elements of the Lemon
test: Secular Purpose and Primary Effect. 127 The statute's objective was to
aid in the higher education of residents of the State, thus a secular
purpose. 128 The Court stated, "[n]eutrality is what is required. The State
must confine itself to secular objectives, and neither advance nor impede
religious activity." 129 This statement appears closely related to the
neutrality test in Smith. For primary effect the statute itself alleviates the
problem through a system of checks and balances, assuring that the
institutions were not using grant funds for sectarian purposes. 130 The
statute therefore passed the frrst two Lemon elements, but because of the
checks-and-balances system, entanglement became the issue. 131
The Court needed to expand its reasoning in both Tilton 132 and
Hunt 133 in order to include State public funds going directly to private
institutions with a religious affiliation. In Roemer, the Court looked to the
district court's findings to establish the level of entanglement. 134 Upon
reviewing the possibilities for entanglement - types of classes funded,
when subsidies were paid out, character of the institution, form of aid,
type of audits, and possibility of political divisiveness - the district
court established that the entanglement here was not so great as to violate
the Establishment Clause because it was not excessive even when viewed
cumulatively. 135
The Smith neutrality test, had it been applied in Roemer, would have
easily lead the Court to a more functional and understandable analysis
than that achieved by applying the Lemon 136 test with potentially fairer
results. Under the neutrality test, the law must be neutral, that is a law of
general applicability. 137 In Roemer, the Maryland statute was based upon
a valid purpose unrelated to religion and applied equally to all private
higher education institutions whether they had a religious affiliation or
not. 138 The statute did not include public higher education institutions
because public institutions were already publicly funded. The law
appears to satisfy the Smith neutrality test in being generally applicable to

127. See id.
128. See id.
129. ld. at 747.
130. See id. at 761-62.
131. See id. at 762.
132. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). See infra notes 281-97 and
accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 89-107 and accompanying text.
134. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 763-65.
135. See id.
136. See supra note 10.
137. See supra note 84.
138. See Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754.
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all private higher education institutions. 139 Whether the law is of general
applicability is all the inquiry that needs be made under the Smith
approach. The Establishment Clause is simply not implicated.
A more complex question, although not nearly as subject to judicial
whim as Lemon, is the applicability of the O'Brien-Turner incidentalimpact test once it is established that the law is based upon some valid
purpose unrelated to religion and thus has only an incidental impact on
religion. The initial inquiry under the O'Brien-Turner incidental-impact
test, it will be recalled, is essentially the same inquiry as that of the Smith
neutrality test. As the Court stated in Roemer, the focus of that Lemon
debate involved the second and third elements, "those concerning the
primary effect of advancing religion, and excessive church-state
entanglement." 140 Under the "incidental impact" test these two concerns
are combined to question what effect the law will have on religion. In
Roemer, the statute stated the institution could only use the funds for
secular purposes. 141 It appeared from the statute's language that the
fund's effect on religion would be nominal, but the State's involvement
in policing the policies might also effect religion to a greater degree.
Nevertheless, all of this would be incidental to the clearly secular purpose
and thus have the same relationship to it that the prohibition against
burning a draft card had to the expressive element of O'Brien's act.
Given this incidental impact, the O'Brien-Turner analysis would
proceed identically to the Hunt v. McNair revenue-bond scenario. 142 The
requirement of furthering a substantial or important government interest
is satisfied for much the same reason as in Hunt: "[T]he purpose of
Maryland's aid program is the secular one of supporting private higher
education generally, as an economic alternative to a wholly public
system." 143 The "purpose" part of the balancing test having been satisfied,
the indirect impact of the "means" on Establishment Clause concerns
must be examined. Would the substantial government interest identified
above be achieved less effectively if the means chosen were not used, and
do those means implicate "substantially more [Establishment Clause
concerns] than [are] needed to further the government's legitimate
interests[]"? 144 Here the answer is structured similarly to the answer in
our Hunt v. McNair analysis. 145 The goal of "supporting higher education
generally" would be "achieved less effectively" if Maryland could not

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Except those that granted religious degrees. See supra text following note 122.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754-55.
See id. at 760.
See supra notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
Roemer, 426 U.S. at 754.
See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
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include "all institutions of higher learning[]." 146 Nor would the related
goal of providing [or ensuring] an economic alternative to a wholly
public system be likewise realized. 147 Put differently, Maryland's goal of
reducing the burden on public colleges and universities by encouraging
private ones would be almost totally meaningless without the aid.
Again, as in Hunt, substantial, additional Establishment Clause
concerns were warranted because Maryland took steps to insure that the
funds were used for secular purposes. 148 Given that the Supreme Court
had more difficulty in Roemer with the entanglement prong of Lemon
than in Hunt, 149 it is clearly the time to slay that particular "dragon," and
with it the Catch-22 paradox. 150 If government monitoring of the manner
in which public funds are spent by private schools with a religious
affiliation is to satisfy O'Brien-Turner - that substantially no more
Establishment Clause concerns were implicated than were necessary to
effectively achieve the governments purpose - then such monitoring is
ipso facto not a problem, unless the educational institution in question
finds it to be one. In that instance, the school can sever that particular aid
program, or perhaps shift its focus to something which requires less
monitoring by the government. 151 The 0 'Brien "incidental impact" test
would thus be satisfied.
The final higher education case, Witters v. Washington Department of
Services for the Blind, 152 forms, in a way, a transition between higher
education and secondary and elementary schools. In Witters, a blind
individual received assistance from the State of Washington under a
disability-based statute. 153 The statute provided public funding for the
specialized education of disabled individuals to enable these persons to
"obtain the maximum degree of self-support and self-care. " 154 The blind
individual in Witters attended a private Christian college to become a
pastor, missionary or youth director. 155
The Court noted the statute had a secular purpose and the
entanglement between State and religion was minimal since the State

146. See supra text following note 119. Of course, here, as in Hunt, seminaries and divinity
schools were excluded from the State aid. See Hunt, 413 U.S. at 736-737; see also Roemer, 426
U.S. at 740.
147. See supra text accompanying note 143.
148. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 23, 32-33 and accompanying text.
151. Our feeling on this point can be summed up by Chief Justice Rehnquist's comment that
"(t]his type of self-defeating result is certainly not required to ensure that [governments) do not
establish religions." Lemon, 472 U.S. at 110.
152. 474 u.s. 481 (1986).
153. See id. at 483.
154. !d.
155. See id.
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paid the individual, who in turn paid the institution. 156 The main issue of
the case surrounded the primary effect of the statute on establishment of
religion. The Court held that "[a]ny aid provided under Washington's
program that ultimately flows to religious institutions does so only as a
result of a genuinely independent and private choice of aid recipients.
Washington's program is 'made available generally without regard to the
sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the institution
benefitted.' " 157 The analysis shows that since the State provided the aid
directly to the individual and his personal choice decided the use, the
primary effect was not the establishment of religion. Thus, the statute did
not violate the Establishment Clause.
Once again the "neutrality" and indirect impact tests would arrive at
the same conclusion through a more direct analysis. As the Court stated
in Witters, the statute had a secular purpose and was available generally,
without distinction as to which institution the individual directed the
compensation. 158 In Witters the plaintiff, under the statutory scheme,
decided the best type of study for his particular needs. This alone would
satisfy our Establishment Clause version of the Smith "neutrality" test
since, under it, a law of general secular applicability simply does not
implicate the Establishment Clause at all merely because it has some
incidental impact upon some of its concerns. 159
The application of the 0 'Brien-Turner test is, of course, more
complicated than the Smith evaluation. 160 The question for the 0 'Brienrumer "incidental impact" test is by now familiar: was the law based
upon some valid purpose unrelated to religion, thus rendering any impact
on Establishment Clause concerns merely incidental? The purpose of the
law was to publicly assist disabled persons to "obtain the maximum
degree of self-support and self-care."161 Any brush with Establishment
Clause concerns would thus be merely incidental. Witters himself chose
the vocation he wished to follow and the education required to do so. The
important or substantial nature of the government's purpose should be
beyond debate. The purpose of maximizing potential self-sufficiency
would obviously lose some of its effectiveness 162 if persons, otherwise
qualified, were denied the aid necessary to achieve the vocation of their

156. See id. at 485.
157. !d. at 487 (quoting Committee for Public Education and Religion v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
at 782-83, n.38). See infra notes 333-53 and accompanying text for furtber discussion of Nyquist.
158. 477 U.S. at 487.
159. See generally notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
160. See generally notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
161. See supra text accompanying note 154.
162. See supra text accompanying note 70.
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choice simply because that vocation involved attending a seminary or
divinity school.
The next question in the 0 'Brien-Turner incidental impact test is
whether the aid to Witters substantially implicated more Establishment
Clause concerns than were necessary to achieve the government's
purpose. 163 The answer is no. Witters, being otherwise qualified for the
aid because of his handicap, had chosen a vocation requiring attendance
at a seminary or divinity school. Nothing less would suffice, so clearly
Establishment Clause concerns were not implicated substantially beyond
that which was necessary.
As the university-level cases reveal, under the three elements of the
Lemon test the Court needed to establish that the legislation did not
violate any of the three elements. Among the university-level cases
presented, not one was seriously questioned under the frrst test, secular
purpose. The problems for the Court arose, if at all, on the second and
third prongs, primary effect and entanglement. The same type of
analytical conclusion regarding Lemon will generally hold true for the
secondary and elementary school cases.
B. Secondary and Elementary Schools
1. The Pre-Lemon Cases: School Busing & Texbooks

The earliest - and perhaps the easiest - of the secondary and
elementary cases to analyze under the "neutrality" and "incidental
impact" tests are those concerning school busing 164 and textbooks. 165
These are pre-Lemon cases, but provide some background for the
eventual development of that test.
Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing 166 dealt
with a New Jersey statute which required the Board of Education to
reimburse students of public and private not-for profit schools, including
those with a religious affiliation, the cost of transportation aboard public
transportation to and from school. 167 The State's statute thus applied
generally to all secondary and elementary schools except private forprofit schools. 168 The Board of Education reimbursed the students out of
generally-collected taxes, which the State used for general public
welfare. 169 The Court held that the statute did not violate the

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra note 69 and accompanying text
See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
See Bd. of Educ. of Central Sch. Dist., No. 1 v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
330 u.s. 1 (1947).
See id. at 2-3.
See id. at 2, n.l.
See id. at 6.
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Establishment Clause because the legislation was simply a general
program to help parents get their children to schoo1. 170
Since Everson was pre-Lemon the Court created an analysis based
upon the history of governmental entanglement with religion in the
American colonies and in Britain. 171 The Court's main concern was the
difficulty of drawing the line between "tax legislation which provides
fund'i for the welfare of the general public and that which is designed to
support institutions which teach religion." 172 The Court concluded that it
could not prohibit the State from extending general State benefits to all
its citizens as long as the benefits were not based upon the recipient's
religious beliefs. 173 Thus, the Court held the statute did not violate the
Establishment Clause. 174
Under the "neutrality" test the Court's analysis would have taken on
more form and substance. 175 Our "neutrality" test inquiry of whether the
statute applies equally to all is easily established in Everson. The Court
even stated that the statute applied equally to religious believers and nonbelievers. 176 The statute therefore passed our version of the Smith
"neutrality" test, and the Establishment Clause is simply not applicable.
The 0 'Brien 's-Turner "incidental impact" test is also satisfied. The
Court acknowledged that governmental payment for bus transportation
may allow additional individuals to attend religious schools, but the
Court analogized this effect to giving police and fire protection to

170. See id. at 18. The Court went on further to state the statute applied "regardless of their
[the children or parents) religion." Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
171. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 8-14. The Court reviewed the effect government entanglement
had upon religion, and the power a religion gained from governmental support. See id. at 9. The
government's support or establishment of one religion over another lead to the majority religious
group persecuting the minority or non-supported religious groups. See id. Virginia created the first
separation of church and state doctrine in the "Virginia Bill for Religious Liberty" written by
Thomas Jefferson. See id. at 12-13. The Court further interpreted the First Amendment's free
exercise of religion and establishment clauses to mean:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away
from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any
religion. . . . No tax in any amount ... can be levied to support any religious
activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
rna y adopt to teach or practice religion. . . . In the words of Jefferson, the
clause against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a wall
of separation between church and state."
ld. at 15-16.
172. ld. at 14.
173. See id. at 16.
174. See id. at 18.
175. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text.
176. See Everson, 330 U.S. at 18.
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religious institutions. 177 Thus, the Court in its own analysis satisfied the
incidental-impact requirement because the statute was directed at a goal
other than assisting religion and had no more than an "incidental" effect
on religion. Once this point is established, the now-familiar178 questions
must be asked: was the government's purpose substantial or important?
This is easily answered in the text of the applicable New Jersey statute.
"Whenever in any district there are children living remote
from any schoolhouse, the board of education of the district
may make rules and contracts for the transportation of such
children to and from school, including the transportation of
school children to and from school other than a public school,
except such school as is operated for profit in whole or in part.
"When any school district provides any transportation for
public school children to and from school, transportation from
any point in such established school route to any other point
in such established school route shall be supplied to school
children residing in such school district in going to and from
school other than a public school, except such school as is
operated for profit in whole or in part." New Jersey Laws
1941, c. 191, p. 581; N.J.R.S. Cum. Supp., tit. 18, c. 14, §8. 179
It is obvious that the goal of assisting children to get to school would be
achieved less effectively, if at all, if the government could not provide
that assistance.
Finally, we must inquire as to whether the transportation program
substantially implicated more Establishment Clause concerns than were
necessary to achieve its admittedly legitimate and important purposes of
educating the State's youth and assisting in transporting them to and from
school. Assuming that at least all not-for-profit private schools 180 formed
an integral part of the State's education system, then merely assisting
children attending schools with a religious affiliation did not clash with
Establishment Clause concerns not substantially more than was
necessary. How could the transportation program have been less and still
gotten the job done? With the "neutrality" or "incidental impact" tests,
the Court could easily have given a direct and easily understandable
analysis for future cases.

177.
178.
179.
180.

See id. at 17-18.
See supra note 69.
Everson, 330 U.S. at 3, and n.l.
See supra text at note 168.
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The next pre-Lemon Establishment clause case, Board of Education
of Central School District, No. 1 v. Allen, 181 concerns the
distribution/loan of textbooks to students attending private elementary
and secondary schools, some of which were religiously affiliated. 182 Allen
involved a New York State law which authorized the school districts of
New York to lend books free of charge to all students grades seven
through twelve. 183 The Board of Education of Central School District
brought the suit to stop using school funds to purchase books which the
law required the Board to loan to parochial school students. 184 The Board
contended that the use of school funds to purchase and then lend books to
religious school students violated the Establishment Clause. 185
The Court rested its decision upon the Everson 186 analysis, holding
that the statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. 187 Again the
Court concluded since the textbooks were not loaned based upon religion,
and the religious schools were not using the books for sectarian teaching,
the statute did not violate the Establishment clause. If the Court applied
the "neutrality" test to the Allen facts, the analysis would be somewhat
less subjective. The New York statute clearly met the neutrality
requirement since books were to be provided to all students between the
seventh and twelfth grade. 188 Not only was the law neutral in regard to
Establishment Clause concerns, but the impact was ipso facto neutral
even without recognizing that the religiously affiliated schools did not
use the loaned books for sectarian teaching. 189 Under the approach
utilized by Justice Scalia in Smith 190 the "neutrality" of the law alone
would be enough to indicate that the loan of textbooks to students is not
subject to First Amendment Scrutiny at all. 191
The O'Brien-Turner analysis 192 would track our application of that
test to the Everson facts. 193 The text book law is directed at a purpose
181. 392 u.s. 236 (1968).
182. See id. at 236-39.
183. See id. at 238.
184. See id. at 240.
185. See id. at 240-41. The New York Court of Appeals stated the laws purpose was to
benefit all students regardless of what school they attended. !d. at 241. The court considered the
law "completely neutral with respect to religion, merely making available secular textbooks at the
request of the individual students and asking no questions about what school he attends." !d.
(quoting Board of Education of Central School District v. Allen, 20 N.Y.2d 109, 228 N.E.2d 791
(1967)).
186. See supra notes 166-74 and accompanying text.
187. See Allen, 392 U.S. at 248-49.
188. See id. at 238.
189. See id. at 248.
190. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
191. See supra text at note 84.
192. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 177-80 and accompanying text.
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having nothing to do with establishing religion. Providing secular
textbooks to children attending private school enhances their educations,
and is as important as providing those same books to students attending
the public schools. It would be difficult to describe placing secular text
books in the hands of students as unimportant or unsubstantial. There is
another purpose, alluded to earlier, 194 which would apply with equal force
in this instance. By providing secular aid such as textbooks to students
attending private schools, the State helps to ensure that private schools
continue to function, and thus a large number of students do not have to
be educated in the public schools; clearly, an important fiscal benefit thus
flows to the State. The textbook program also easily meets the narrow
tailoring requirement. It is easy to see that the State purpose of enhancing
education by providing textbooks would be less effective if the text books
had not been provided. 195 As to aiding private schools in this way in order
to reduce the number of children in public schools, there are presumably
many other things which could have been done, but probably none
equally or more effective, considering the cost involved and the absolute
neutrality of textbooks as compared to other alternatives. It is this
neutrality that establishes that substantially no more Establishment
Clause concerns than necessary were involved. Thus, the "neutrality" and
"incidental impact" tests give a simple, concise analysis to the Allen
facts.
2. The Federal Statute Cases
Federal statute Establishment clause cases are the next major
elementary and secondary school area this article will analyze: Bowen,
Secretary of Health and Human Services v. Kendrick, 196 Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills School District, 197 Wheeler v. Barrera, 198 Aguilar v.
Felton 199 and Tilton v. Richardson. 200 As stated, the cases deal with
federal statutes: the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), 201 the

194. See Sllpra text following note 147.
195. See supra note 69.
196. 487 u.s. 589 (1988).
197. 509 u.s. 1 (1993).
198. 417 u.s. 402 (1973).
U.S. _ , 117 S. Ct. 1997
199. 4 73 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled in Agostini v. Felton, _
(1997). See infra notes 491-496 and accompanying text.
200. 403 u.s. 672 (1971).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 300 (1991). Congress created the AFLA to authorize federal grants to
public, private and religious organizations to provide "services and research in the area of
premarital adolescent sexual relations and pregnancy." Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 589. The AFLA lists
the following:
'[N]ecessary services' that may be funded[:] pregnancy testing and maternity
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Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 202 the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965 203 and the Higher Education
Facilities Act of 1963.204
In Bowen v. Kendrick, the Court noted that Congress established
AFLA to correct what Congress perceived as a social problem. 205 AFLA
established grants to certain organizations; grant money recipients
included religious hospitals, community centers and charitable
organizations. 206 Taxpayers and clergymen filed suit, stating AFLA
violated the Establishment Clause. 207 The group asserted that AFLA

counseling, adoption counseling and referral services, prenatal and postnatal
health care, nutritional information, counseling, child care, mental health
services, and perhaps most importantly for present purposes, 'educational
services relating to family life and problems associated with adolescent
premarital sexual relations.
Id. at 594.
202. 20 U.S.C. § 1400-1402 (1991) Congress created the IDEA to benefit disabled
individuals who needed additional assistance while attending schools. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 5.
Congress stated:
[P]urpose of this chapter [was] to assure that all handicapped children have
available to them, ... , a free appropriate public education which emphasizes
special education and related services designed to meet their unique needs, to
assure that the rights of handicapped children and their parents or guardians
are JXotected, to assist States and localities to provide for the education of all
handicapped children, and to assess and assure the effectiveness of efforts to
educate handicapped children.
20 U.S.C. § 1400(c) (emphasis added).
203. 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (1991). Congress' stated "purpose of this chapter is to enable schools
to provide opportunities for children served to acquire the knowledge and skills contained in the
challenging State content standards and to meet the challenging State performance standards
developed for all children." 20 U.S.C. § 6301(d) (1991).
204. 20 U.S.C. §§ 711-721, 751(a)(2) (1964). Congress' purpose in passing the act was to
satisfy a "strong nationwide demand for the expansion of college and university facilities to meet
the sharply rising number of young people demanding higher education." Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675.
205. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593.
206. See id. at 597. In addition, state and local governmental agencies, private hospitals and
non-aligned charitable organizations also received grants under the AFLA. See id.
207. See id. at 597-58. The district court held that AFLA violated the Establishment clause
because it failed the second and third test of Lemon. See id. at 598-600. The Supreme Court also
considered an argument that even if the law was not facially invalid under Lemon, the
Establishment Clause was violated in the manner in which it was "applied" by the Secretary of
Health and Human Services. On this point, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the trial court:
[T] he court should consider on remand whether particular AFLA grants have
had the primary effect of advancing religion. Should the court conclude that
the Secretary's current practice does allow such grants, it should devise a
remedy to insure that grants awarded by the Secretary comply with the
Constitution and the statute. The judgment of the District Court is accordingly
reversed.
ld. at 622.
Under our proposed tests, the question in addition to whether the Secretary's actions complied
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violated the Establishment Clause because government funds were going
directly to religious organizations, and the religious organizations were
allowed to solve the perceived social problem, adolescent sexual
activity. 208
The Court reviewed the case under the Lemon test. 209 The first
element, the law's promotion of a secular purpose, was easily found by
the Court since the reduction of teenage pregnancy and parenthood is a
general social problem. 210 The second element, primary effect of the
legislation as advancing religion, was harder for the Court to analyze. The
Court overturned the lower court's presumption that religiously affiliated
institutions cannot provide services in a purely secular manner. 211 The
Court stated that the judiciary cannot strike down statutes because of an
anticipated breach of the Establishment clause. 212 The Court went on to
hold that neither AFLA' s recognition that "religious organizations have a
role to play" in trying to solve the problem of teen sexuality, 213 nor the
fact that the law allows religiously affiliated organizations to participate
as grantees or subgrantees in AFLA programs"214 caused the law's
primary effect to be that of advancing religion. 215 Thus, AFLA passed the
second element of Lemon.
Excessive entanglement is the third element of the Lemon test. The
Kendrick Court recognized the Catch-22 quandary that the supervision
necessary to assure the grants are not used for religious purposes
necessarily entangles the government in the religion's operations. 216 The
Court then created a fiction in order to enable AFLA to withstand the
third element of the Lemon test by differentiating religious organizations
from religious parochial schools. 217 However, the Court did not state why
counseling and education of teenagers by religious counselors is any
different from parochial school teachers. 218 Additionally, the Court stated
that less intrusive monitoring (even though the Court did not enlighten

with AFLA would be whether they complied with whichever of our proposed tests is used.
208. /d. at 597-99.
209. See supra note 10.
210. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 602. The Court refused to question Congress' stated purpose.
/d. at 604.
211. See id. at 612.
212. See id.
213. /d. at 605-606.
214. /d. at 606.
215. /d. at 604-615.
216. See id. at 615-16.
217. See id.
218. The district court in its opinion noted that under the Lemon test the AFLA programs
"provide[ d) a crucial symbolic link between government and religion, thereby enlisting, at least in
the eyes of those youngsters, the power of government to the support of religion denominations."
Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F. Supp. 1547, 1561 (1987), rev'd 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
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the reader regarding what the monitoring was) did not violate the
Entanglement element of the Lemon test. 219 Thus, AFLA did not violate
the Establishment clause.
Even though Kendrick was not a true elementary and secondary
school case, the type of education and counseling provided by AFLA was
arguably very similar to parochial school teachings. AFLA provided
counseling and education to teenagers regarding sexual relationships and
pregnancy. 220 If the Court had used the "neutrality" or the "incidental
impact" test instead of Lemon, the Court would not have needed to create
the fiction that counselors are not equal to teachers. The Court's finding
that the statute was facially neutral and provided for a secular purpose221
would have guaranteed that AFLA passed the "neutrality" test of
Smith. 222
Under our vision of the "incidental impact" test, the Court first
would need to find that the law is based on a valid secular purpose, and
the impact upon Establishment Clause concerns is by definition indirect.
Thus, AFLA only had an incidental effect on those concerns. Put
differently, the simple recognition that the government's purpose was to
provide counseling to children to help alleviate a clearly recognized grave
problem of teen pregnancy223 made any benefit to religion merely
incidental.
This established, it remains to be determined whether the means
which included religious organizations among those groups tapped to
provide the counseling was narrowly tailored. 224 By now, it should be
fairly clear that in this context narrow tailoring consists of two
interrelated concepts. The first is that the government purpose would be
less effectively achieved if required to be carried out some other way. 225
Since Congress found that "'[such] problems are best approached
through a variety of integrated and essential services provided to
adolescents and their families by other family members, religious and
charitable organizations, voluntary associations, and other groups in the
private sector as well as services provided by publicly sponsored

219. See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 615-16.
220. See id. at 594.
221. See id. at 602.
222. See supra notes 71-77 and accompanying text. Simply put, the law was based upon a
valid purpose unrelated to religion and applied equally to all. Thus, the &tablishment Clause
simply would not apply.
223. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 593.
224. See supra note 69.
225. It is this point that is the principle distinction between the use of the phrase "narrowly
tailored" in other contexts as a synonym for "necessary" with its requirement of inquiring about
the existence of less drastic means. The concept of less drastic means cannot be part of a
balancing test that asks would the purpose be less effectively achieved by different means.
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initiatives,"'226 the purpose obviously would be achieved less effectively
absent the involvement of religious organizations.
However, in order to insure that this recognition of the importance of
efficacy in carrying out the govermnental purpose does not unduly
intrude into constitutional limitations, the Court has required that the
govermnent's foray into constitutionally protected interests not be
substantially greater than what isneeded to achieve the govermnent' s
goal. 227 Since the government considered it important to involve many
groups perceived to have the necessary expertise and since the
involvement of religious organizations was hedged about with
safeguards, 228 this requirement is clearly satisfied.
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Districf 29 concerned a deaf
individual attending a religiously-affiliated secondary school, the State
supplying the school with an interpreter under IDEA. 230 The Act required
States to provide special services for disabled individuals for educational
purposes. 231 Arizona declined to give Zobrest an interpreter because the
State viewed the funding of the interpreter as a violation of the
Establishment Clause. 232 The State's argument was based upon the
interpreter acting as a conduit for religious indoctrination, and since the
interpreter was paid with govermnent funds, a violation of the
Establishment Clause would have occurred. 233

226. Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 595 (citation omitted).
227. See generally supra note 69
228. The Court summarized the safegaurds as follows:
We note that the AFLA requires each grantee to undergo evaluations of the
services it provides, § 300z..5(b)(l), and also requires grantees to "make such
reports concerning its use of Federal funds as the Secretary may require,"
§ 300z..5(c). The application requirements of the Act, as well, require potential
grantees to disclose in detail exactly what services they intend to provide and
how they will be provided. § 300z..5(a). These provisions, taken together, create
a mechanism whereby the Secretary can police the grants that are given out
under the Act to ensure that federal funds are not used for impermissible
purposes. Unlike some other grant programs, in which aid might be given out
in one-time grants without ongoing supervision by the Government, the
programs established under the authority of the AFLA can be monitored to
determine whether the funds are, in effect, being used by the grantees in such
a way as to advance religion. Given this statutory scheme, we do not think that
the absence of an express limitation on the use of federal funds for religious
purposes means that the statute, on its face, has the primary effect of
advancing religion.

Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 615.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

509 U.S. I (1992).
ld. at 4.
ld. at 3.
]d.
ld. at 5.
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Although the Court of Appeals reviewed the Act and its effect under
Lemon, it is not clear that the Supreme Court did likewise. If it did so, it
focused on the "Primary Effect" element. 234 The Court first reiterated that
it had "consistently held that government programs that neutrally provide
benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to religion
are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge just because
sectarian institutions may also receive an attenuated financial benefit."235
Providing this explanation, the Court continued:
The service at issue in this case is part of a general
government program that distributes benefits neutrally to any
child qualifying as "disabled" under the IDEA, without regard
to the "secretarian-nonsecretarian, or public-nonpublic
nature" of the school the child attends. By according parents
freedom to select a school of their choice, the statute ensures
that a government-paid interpreter will be present in a
secretarian school only as a result of the private decision of
individual parents. In other words, because the IDEA creates
no financial incentive for parents to choose a sectarian school,
an interpreter's presence there cannot be attributed to state
decisionmaking. 236

Faced with an argument that physical placement of the interpreter on
the campus of the religiously-affiliated private school violated the
Establishment Clause the Court found that
[T]he task of a sign-language interpreter seems to us quite
different from that of a teacher or guidance counselor. [T]he
Establishment Clause lays down no absolute bar to the
placing of a public employee in a sectarian school. Such a flat
rule, smacking of antiquated notions of "taint," would indeed
exalt form over substance. Nothing in this record suggests
that a sign-language interpreter would do more than
accurately interpret whatever material is presented to the
class as a whole. In fact, ethical guidelines require
interpreters to "transmit everything that is said in exactly the
same way it was intended." James' parents have chosen of
their own free will to place him in a pervasively sectarian
environment. The sign-language interpreter they have
requested will neither add to nor subtract from that

234. See id. at 10-14.
235. /d. at 8.
236. /d. at 10.
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environment, and hence the provision of such assistance is not
barred by the Establishment Clause. 237

The initial inquiry in the "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests
would operate in a very similar fashion in the Zobrest case. First, the Act
is neutrally applied because any disabled student can gain the benefits of
the act whether attending public or private elementary or secondary
schools, and whether religiously affiliated or not. 238 As should now be
apparent, the Smith tese 39 would be easily satisfied by the Zobrest facts.
IDEA was a neutral law that applied to all schools whether religiouslyaffiliated or not. Therefore, the Establishment Clause was simply not
implicated.
IDEA had no more than an incidental effect on the establishment of
religion, because the purpose of the law had nothing to do with religion.
The interpreter is a conduit, and the disabled individual is simply
obtaining information in a different form than would a normal child.
"Nothing in the record suggests that a sign-language interpreter would do
more than accurately interpret. ... "240 The balancing-of-interests aspect
of 0 'Brien-Turner 41 test is easily satisfied. Providing the services needed
to assist disabled persons in obtaining an education is clearly important or
substantial. Both prongs of the narrow tailoring component of the test are
also easily met. Clearly, the federal goal of educational aid to the
handicapped would be less broadly, and thus less effectively, achieved
were schools with a religious affiliation excluded. And, for the same
reason, substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns are
implicated than need be. Therefore, under either test IDEA is
constitutional.
The federal statute cases Wheeler v. Barrera 242 and Aguilar v.
Felton. 243 both dealt with the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of
1965. 244 Wheeler is not, strictly speaking, an Establishment Clause case
under the Court's analysis but shows the fiction the Court created to
uphold a statute. The Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965
provided State governments with federal funds to educate deprived
children in public and private schools including those with a religious

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
(1997).
244.

!d. at 13 (footnotes omitted).
See id. at 10.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
509 U.S. at 13.
See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
417 u.s. 402 (1973).
473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled in Agostini v. Belton,_ U.S. _ , 117 S.Ct. 1997

See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 405; See also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 404.
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affiliation. 245 The case arose when the Missouri State Commissioner of
Education refused to provide federal funds under the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act of 1965 to private and parochial schools but did
provide the funds to public schools. 246 The State defended its actions
stating the funding of parochial schools was against Missouri law and the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 247
The Court analyzed the case not under Lemon but under a neutrality
type test. 248 Since the State did not provide for equal "comparable"
services to private and parochial schools, the State violated the statutes
requirements. 249 The Court reviewed the statute and noted the word
"comparable" services did not mean identical services. 250 Instead of
explaining what would satisfy a "comparable" service under Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965, the Court left the issue up to the
State, and noted the possibility of an Establishment Clause problem, but
refused to elaborate further -thus the fiction. 251 The State might effect
the Establishment Clause under Lemon by using federal funds in
parochial schools to fulfil the statute's requirements. Had the Court used
either the "neutrality" or "incidental impact" test, the States would have
had the guidance necessary to comply with the federal statute.
Under the "neutrality" test the State would merely have to supply the
funds to programs on a neutral basis. The State should distribute the
federal funds to public schools and to private schools, regardless of any
existence of religious affiliation, on the basis of need to comply with the
purpose of Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965. The
neutrality of our adaptation of the Smith test252 -a law that is generally
applicable, and not directed at Establishment Clause concerns - is
clearly established by the Court of Appeals' description of the purpose of
the federal law. It "require[d] a program for educationally deprived nonpublic school children that is comparable in quality, scope and
opportunity, which may or may not necessarily be equal in dollar
expenditures to that provided in the public schools." 253 The law is thus

245. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 405.
246. 417 U.S. at 408.
247. See id.
248. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 420-21.
249. See id. at 420. The State did proVide federal funding to private schools in compliance
with the statute after the district court's decision. See id. However, the parochial schools required
that the State supply public school teachers to teach the deprived children within the parochial
schools. See id. at 409-10. The conflict arose because the State would not provide public school
teachers to the parochial schools. /d.
250. See id. at 420-23.
251. See id. at 423-26.
252. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
253. Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 411 (citing Wheeler, 475 F.2d, at 1344).
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universally applicable to all educationally deprived children. That it may
brush up against Establishment Clause concerns is of no consequence,
and the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment is simply
inapplicable.
The "incidental impact" test would also be satisfied since the funds
were used directly for the benefit of handicapped and disabled children.
The parents of the affected children had the choice of where to send their
children for education: either a private, a public, or a parochial school.
Since the services in all schools were equally suitable for the disabled
and handicapped children, the parents had no ulterior motive in choosing
one school over another. The "important" or "substantial purpose"
component of the O'Brien-Turner incidental-impact test2 54 is easily met.
It would be difficult to reasonably dispute that ensuring a basic equality
of treatment of educationally deprived students, whether in public or
private school, is not an important governmental goal. The first of the
"means" components- that the goal or purpose would be achieved less
effectively some other way255 - appears clearly to be satisfied. Indeed,
here, it is difficult to even think of "another way" that might work, even
less effectively. The federal law provided the broadest scope of
alternatives to the States. 256 The second Means Component - that there
is not substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause concerns
than needed - is also apparently satisfied, considering the broad
discretion that the State apparently had to implement the federal
program. 257 Thus, the "neutrality'' and "incidental impact" tests could
guide a State, and thereby help the State legislatures comply with the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965.
Aguilar v. Felton, 258 is also based on the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965. 259 The major difference between the two cases is
that in Aguilar the State attempted to comply with the Court's
requirement for comparable services by placing public teachers and other
professionals into parochial schools to teach the deprived children. 260 The
State of New York thus created the comparable system to comply with
the Act. 261 The public funds supplied all the teachers, books, and
supplies, thus insuring that the teaching was strictly secular. 262 In

254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
schools,

See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
!d.
See supra text at note 245.
See supra note 52-70 and accompanying text.
473 U.S. 402, overruled in Agostini, 117 S.Ct. 1997.
See Wheeler, 417 U.S. 402.
See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406.
See id. at 407.
See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 407. In addition, the classes were taught at the parochial
but the school was required to remove all religious symbols from the room before the
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addition, the State of New York implemented a review program whereby
an individual would make monthly surprise visits to the classrooms to
assess whether religious teachings were being taught. 263
The Court in Aguilar used the Lemon analysis to decide the
constitutionality of New York's attempt to comply with the Elementary
and Secondary Education Act of 1965. 264 In Aguilar the Court bypassed
the Lemon test's f'rrst two prongs, Secular Purpose and the Effect, and
instead based its reasoning on the third prong, Entanglement. 265 The
Court stated the State's monitoring technics were pervasive. 266 In
interpreting the Establishment Clause, the Court's noted, "the objective
[is] . . . to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [church or
state] into the precincts of the other."267 Therefore, the Court without
describing at what point the New York's interpretation of the Act
violated the Establishment Clause simply stated New York's actions
under the Act violated the Establishment Clause. 268
Either of our proposed substitutes for Lemon is preferable as a way
for the Court to analyze an Establishment Clause case. The Aguilar case
is a prime example of where the "neutrality" test could better guide a
State and its actions than the frequently unworkable Lemon test. As the
Court noted in Wheeler and Aguilar, the Act's goals are purely secular,
i.e., to help deprived children, and the program was neutrally applied to
all deprived children, e.g. not based upon where the child went to
school. 269 Thus, the Act passed the "neutrality" test and the frrst prong of
the "incidental impact" test, neutral application for a secular purpose.
Since the federal law in question in Aguilar is identical to that of
Wheeler, nothing more is needed than to refer to our discussion of the
impact of our adaptation of the Smith test of the latter case. 270 Particular
emphasis is placed on our statement that "[t]he law is thus generally
applicable to the universe of educationally deprived children. The fact
that it may brush up against Establishment Clause concerns is of no
consequence and the First Amendment simply does not apply."271

classes began. See id.
263. See id. at 409.
264. See id. at 410.
265. See id. at 409-13.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 413 (citing Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 614).
268. See id. at 414. Because the Court in Wheeler did not define separate but equal,
comparable services, and how a State should comply or could comply with the Act, States were
left to experiment and fight against such lawsuits as Aguilar.
269. See Wheeler, 417 U.S. at 420; See also Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-10.
270. See supra notes 251-53 and accompanying text.
271. !d.
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As with our adaptation of the Smith test, much of what we concluded
regarding the applicability of our adaptation of the 0 'Brien-Turner test to
Wheele,-2 72 applies to Aguilar. Since the Court in Aguilar chose to
invalidate the State's implementation of the federal law based on one
aspect of the entanglement prong of Lemon, 273 reference needs to be made
to what we said earlier on that point. 274
The "incidental impact" test's second prong, Effect on Religion, is a
much more direct method to determine constitutionality of the Act than
the Lemon test. Under Aguilar, New York's so-called "pervasive
monitoring techniques" consisted of using professional teachers and
counselors to lower the risk of subliminal religious indoctrination, a
surprise monthly visit by a field officer of the State, and requiring the
school to remove all religious symbols from rooms where the teachers
would be teaching. 275 The State implemented the review and personal
procedures to reduce the risk of the students being taught sectarian values
while under the Act's teaching requirements. 276 In Kendrick, the Court
stated that courts should not act based upon anticipatory breach of the
Establishment Clause. 277 A monthly visit by a field officer and requiring a
removal of religious symbols from a classroom can hardly be considered
pervasive, especially when the Court has allowed a State to collect rent
and regulate how a school can utilize a building. 278 Therefore, New
York's monitoring system should have no more than an incidental effect
on religion, thus, setting up the balancing aspect of the 0 'Brien-Turner
test. Little time needs to be spent on the Gravity of Purpose portion of the
O'Brien-Turner test. Few would quibble with the idea that providing this
kind of assistance to children is important. As far as the two components
of "narrowly tailored means", we repeat the earlier statement in Wheeler:

The first of the means components- that the goal or purpose
would be achieved less effectively some other way - appears
clearly to be satisfied. Indeed, here, it is difficult to even think
of "another way" that might work, even less effectively. The
federal law provided the broadest scope of alternatives to the
States. The second means component that there is not
substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause
concerns than needed appears also to be satisfied given the

272.
273.
274.
275.
276.
277.
278.

See supra notes 254-77 and accompanying text.
Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409-14.
See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409.
See id.
See Kendrick, 487 U.S. at 612.
See supra notes 103-107 and accompanying text.
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broad discretion that the State apparently had to implement
the federal program. 279

There remains the argument that "entanglement" will cause
substantially more intrusion into Establishment Clause concerns than is
really necessary. Again, we reiterate our aforestated conclusion:
[N]ow is the time to slay ... [the entanglement] dragon and
with it the Catch-22 paradox. If government monitoring of
how public funds are spent by private schools with a religious
affiliation in order to satisfy the O'Brien-Turner requirement
that substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns
were implicated that were necessary to effectively achieve the
governments purpose, then such monitoring is ipso facto not a
problem unless the educational institution in question finds it
to be one. In that case the school can serve that particular aid
program or [perhaps] shift its focus to something that requires
less monitoring by the government. Thus, the O'Brien
"incidental impact" test would be satisfied. 280

The final case in the area of federal statute cases is Tilton v.
Richardson. 281 In Tilton the Court reviewed the constitutionality of the
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963. 282 The case was very similar to
Roemer83 but concerned federal, rather than state, funding. Tilton
involved the federal government offering of grants to public, private and
religious institutions of higher learning for university facilities. 284 The
universities could only use the facility for secular purposes, but after
twenty years the facility would revert to university control. 285 If the
university violated the Act by using the facility for religious activities the
university would be required to reimburse the government for the
proportion of the present value the grant bore to the original cost. 286
The Court reviewed the case under Lemon. 287 Within the Act itself
Congress stated the purpose was to advance higher education at all
institutions, which the Court concluded was a legitimate secular
purpose. 288 The Act passed the frrst prong of the Lemon test. The Court

279. See supra, text accompanying notes 255-57.
280. See supra text accompanying notes 150-52.
281. 403 u.s. 672 (1971).
282. See id. at 675.
283. See supra notes 121-134 and accompanying text.
284. See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 675.
285. See id. at 683-84. The fact that the school could use the building after the passage of
twenty years for sectarian purposes caused the court to invalidate this part of the law. /d.
286. See id. at 675.
287. See id. at 678.
288. See id. at 678-79.
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then reviewed the primary effect of the Act on the establishment of
religion. 289 The Court found that since the grants were for secular
facilities, the primary effect of the Act was not to advance religion. 290 The
Court additionally held that universities are not as pervasive with
religious doctrine as are religiously-affiliated secondary and elementary
schools.Z91 The Court also did not have a problem with entanglement
since the grants were one-time payments. 292 The Court concluded that the
entanglement was minimal since cursory inspections were all that were
necessary to confirm the building was being used for purely secular
activities. 293
The "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests would arrive at the
same conclusion, but in a more straightforward fashion. The Court stated
that the statute had a purely secular purpose. 294 Thus, its impact on
religion was incidental. It also was similarly neutral in that the law was
unrelated to the religious affiliation of a particular university. Thus the
"neutrality" test and the first portion of the "incidental impact" test are
satisfied.
Stated differently, insofar as our adaptation of Smith 295 is pertinent, it
suffices to say that the aid involved in Tilton was generally applicable to
all higher education institutions. As such, the merely incidental and very
minimal brush with Establishment Clause concerns does not change the
rule that the First Amendment is simply inapplicable. The application of
our O'Brien-Turner analysis 296 would follow that applied to Hunt. 291
One factual difference between Hunt and Tilton provides an
opportunity to highlight the operation of the part of our O'Brien-Turner
analysis which requires that the means selected by government must not
encroach on substantially more Establishment Clause concerns than are
needed to ensure the effective accomplishment to the government's
goal. 298 In Tilton, the government had limited the ban on religious use of
the building constructed with government funds to 20 years. 299 In the
language of the O'Brien-Turner test, this provision is substantially more
encroachment on Establishment Clause concerns than is needed for
effective accomplishment of the government's goal. The Court severed

289.
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291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
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See Tilton, 403 U.S. at 679.
See id. at 681-82.
See id. at 682-83.
See id. at 687-88.
See id.
See id. at 679.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 114-20 and accompanying text.
See supra note 69.
Tilton, 403 U.S. at 683.
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the 20 year provision and let the remainder of the law stand. 300 This
holding is precisely what would occur under our adaptation of the
0 'Brien-Turner test. Additionally, since the facilities were merely for
secular activities for twenty years, the effect on religion would be
minimal. Thus, the "incidental impact" test would also be satisfied
because the grants affected the religious teaching minimally, by giving
the building to the university in 20 years. Therefore, the federal statute
cases arrive at the same outcome under both Lemon and, under the
"neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests, but with the later tests giving a
better guiding light for courts and legislatures to follow.
C. Direct Funding to Elementary and Secondary Schools
The greatest area of confusion and misuse of the Lemon test happens
in the area of state funding provided to elementary and secondary schools
with a religious affiliation. Among the primary cases within this subgroup
are Lemon v. Kurtzman/ 01 Committee for Public Education & Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 302 Levitt v. Committee for Public Education &
Religious Liberty, 303 Wolman v. Walter, 304 and Meek v. Pittenger. 305 In the
Lemon case, the Supreme Court assembled the three part Establishment
Clause conflict test (the Lemon test). 306 This article will analyze each of
these cases under the "neutrality" and "incidental impact" tests. 307
As stated previously, Lemon dealt with two state statutes, one from
Rhode Island and the other from Pennsylvania. 308 The statutes provided
state funding for religious and private schools for purely secular
teachings. 309 Both statutes provided funding, either directly to the private
school (whether or not it had a religious affiliation) or directly to the
teacher, to solve an important state purpose, education. 310 Both States
sought to solve the decline in quality secular teaching at private and
religious schools. 311 Rhode Island's statute312 used equalization to solve
the problem by equalizing the salaries of private school teachers,

300.
301.
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
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307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

!d. at 683-84.
403 u.s. 602 (1971).
413 u.s. 756 (1973).
413 U.S. 472 (1973).
433 u.s. 229 (1977).
421 u.s. 349 (1975).
See Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 612-13. The Lerrwn test consisted of three prongs: neutrality,
outcome, and entanglement between government and religion. See id.
See supra notes 52-78 and accompanying text.
See Lerrwn, 403 U.S. at 606-09.
See id.
See id.
See id.
R.I. GEN. LAWS. § 16-51-1 (Supp. 1970).
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including those who taught secular subjects in a school with a religious
affiliation, with the salaries of those who taught in public schools. 313 In
Pennsylvania, 314 the State reimbursed the non-public school for "secular
education services."315 Both statutes contained procedures to protect the
funds from going to sectarian teachings, such as audits of funds spent and
examination of records in order to compute reimbursements. 316
As noted in Lemon, the Supreme Court reviewed the statutes based
upon the newly developed Lemon test. 317 The first prong of the
"incidental impact" test and the only prong of the "neutrality" test require
the state statute or law be equally applied. In Lemon, both the Rhode
Island and Pennsylvania statutes applied equally to all private schools
whether or not they had a religious affiliation. 318 Rhode Island sought to
bring qualified teachers to all schools. 319 To accomplish the goal, the
State used an equalization funding program to subsidize all secular
teaching within Rhode Island schools. 320 In Pennsylvania, the State's goal
was much the same. 321 However, in Pennsylvania the State sought to
purchase secular teaching from all schools. 322 Both States had a
substantial governmental purpose, education of the State's children, and
applied the means to accomplish the purpose neutrally. Therefore, the
statutes passed the "neutrality" test and the first prong of the "incidental
impact" test. Thus under the neutrality test, the Establishment Clause
simply would not apply. Having an incidental impact (The purpose was to
improve secular education in private schools including those with a
religious affiliation; therefore, the brush with Establishment Clause
concerns is merely incidental.), we now need to turn to the other elements
of that test.
The main purposes behind the Pennsylavania and Rhode Island laws
were to bring the private school's secular teachings up to par with the
public school system. 323 Surely, a state government seeking to equalize
the secular education within their state is an important governmental
purpose. The next major step is to decide if the method both states used

313. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 607-09. The Rhode Island plan allowed the State to supplement
non-public school teachers who taught secular subjects up to 15%, but not over, the salary of
public teachers. See id. at 607.
314. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, §§ 5601-5609 (Supp. 1971).
315. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 609-10. The statute gave the State the right to purchase secular
teachings from non-public schools. See id. at 609.
316. See id. at 606-10.
317. See id. at 602.
318. See id. at 607-10.
319. See id. at 607-08.
320. See id.
321. See id. at 609-10.
322. See id.
323. See id. 606-09.
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was narrowly tailored. 324 Based upon the O'Brien-Turner tests, the
government's purpose would have to be less effective if carried out by
other means and those means must not intrude on Establishment Clause
concerns in a substantially greater manner than needed to accomplish the
purpose. 325
In Lemon, the State governments sought to accomplish their goal
through direct funding of the secular education at private schools,
including those with a religious affiliation. 326 Without direct funding the
States would have to hire, train and supervise additional teachers to teach
secular subjects to the private school students. This method would
accomplish the same goals, but far less effectively.
The second portion of the equation requires that the means must not
interfere with Establishment Clauses concerns substantially more than is
necessary to accomplish the purpose. 327 The brush against the
Establishment Clause was not substantially greater than necessary simply
because the States were supporting secular education in schools with
religious affiliation. Monitoring of state funding would reduce the
proximity of the State aid to the Establishment Clause even further. This,
of course, brings up the entanglement concern (the third prong of the
Lemon Test). The answer is as we have stated it twice already. State
monitoring of the teacher's actions is a problem only if the private school
finds it to be so. 328 The incidental impact test would thus find no violation
of the Establishment Clause.
Nyquisf 29 dealt with New York's attempt to raise non-public schools
quality of education to a level equivalent to public schools through the
Health and Safety Grants for Non-public School Children Program and
the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity Program. 330 The
Health and Safety Grant program consisted of funds for maintenance and
repair of school facilities. 331 New York limited the grants to $30 per

324. See supra note 69.
325. See id.
326. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606-09. Even though each state accomplished the direct funding
mechanism in a different manner, the effect was the same: direct funding for secular studies. See
id.
327. See supra notes 69-70.
328. See supra notes 150-151 and accompanying text. See also supra note 280 and
accompanying text.
329. 413 u.s. 756 (1973).
330. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 762, 764.
331. See id. at 763. The statute defined maintenance and repair as "the provision of heat,
light, water, ventilation and sanitary facilities; cleaning, janitorial and custodial services; snow
removal; necessary upkeep and renovation of buildings, grounds and equipment; fire and accident
protection; and such other items as the conunissioner may deem necessary to ensure the health,
welfare and safety of enrolled students." !d.
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student or $40 per student if the facility was over twenty-five years old. 332
The Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity program offered
subsidies to lower income families for reimbursement of school expenses
($50 for grade school or $100 for high school-not to exceed 50% of
tuition). 333 The program also gave tax savings to high income taxpayers,
but the tax savings decreased as the income became higher. 334
The Court used the recently developed Lemon test to decide the
constitutionality of the programs. 335 It concluded that since the programs
did not state a particular non-public school objective and were for an
important governmental purpose, the programs passed the Lemon test's
secular purpose element. 336 The Court did not need to tangle (so to speak)
with the third Lemon element, entanglement, since the State was not
involved except in the distribution of funds. 337
Therefore, in Nyquist the Court's primary concern was the effect the
funds had on the advancement of religion. 338 The Court stated that the
Health and Safety Grants "inevitably . . . subsidize and advance the
religious mission of sectarian schools. " 339 The Court applied the same
reasoning to the Elementary and Secondary Education Opportunity
program. 340 The Court struggled with the problem of direct aid to the
parents, contrasted with direct aid to the schools, but held the purpose of
the aid was to directly support sectarian schools. 341 Therefore, both
programs failed the Lemon test's second element, primary effect, and the
Court held both programs unconstitutional.
Applying the "neutrality" test and the "O'Brien-Turner" incidental
impact test (since New York sought to equalize health and safety
measures of public and private schools and create diversity by modestly
assisting parents to enroll their children in private schools-perhaps
reducing the number of children in the public school systems), the
programs were both neutral respecting Establishment Clause concerns
and had only an incidental effect on those concerns. Thus the programs
passed the "neutrality" test and the first portion of the "incidental impact"
test. Under the Smith neutrality test, the Establishment Clause would not
even apply. In further support of the indirect nature of the impact, the
Health and Safety Grants merely provided funds to non-public schools for
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repairs and maintenance. 342 The schools used the funds for upkeep and
maintenance of buildings, not the teaching of religion or purchasing
religious materials. Under the O'Brien-Turner test the Court's Lemon
reasoning (which suggested that the schools could use the funds to pay an
employee to clean the school chapel or renovate a room where religion is
taughe 43 ) is simply of no moment. Put somewhat differently, the State set
out to improve health and safety at schools, some of which had a
religious affiliation. This purpose is equivalent to the expressed neutral
purpose in 0' Brien of having a draft card. The fact that someone might
want to burn the card was only incidentally affected by the law. Here the
relationship of health and safety purposes to Establishment Clause
concerns is the same. The same analysis would apply to the modest
subsidies provided to parents. Offering them some choice as to where to
send their children to school (and reducing the pressure on the public
schools) is totally unrelated to advancing religion and has only an
incidental impact on such advancement, if any.
Under the remainder of the O'Brien-Turner test, the proposed New
York statutes must be important. New York's purpose was to make sure
the buildings that school children used were kept at a minimum standard
of repair and cleanliness. 344 In addition, the State did not want a great
influx of private and religious school students into the public system
which could not handle the additional students without great expense to
the State. 345 Therefore, New York's programs addressed important
governmental purposes: the safety and well being of the students, the
protection of the public school system and a choice provided to the
parents.
The next issue under the 0 'Brien-Turner test is whether the means
New York used were narrowly tailored to accomplish the governmental
purpose of each law. 346 As stated previously, New York sought to provide
safe and clean schools for all school children and protect its public school
systems viability. 347 A per student allocation of funds allowed the State to
disburse funds on the needs of the schools based upon student population.
The means accomplished the State's purpose efficiently because the
schools with more students would require greater maintenance and repair.
Employees of the school system could have been sent to effectuate the
health and safety purposes. However, this would clearly be less effective

342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.

See id. at 762-63. See supra note 331 for description of maintenance and repairs.
Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774.
See id. at 763-64.
See id. at 765.
See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 763-65.
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than the simple payment of funds for repair and safety. For one thing, the
State would not have been required to employ additional personnel with
fringe benefits and other problems that might involve. Thus there can be
little doubt that the direct payment of funds was more effective than
having school system personnel do the work If one assumes that the
primary purpose of the Education Opportunity Program was to ease the
burden on the public school system by making private school education
somewhat more affordable, then it is almost axiomatic that the greater
number of students enrolled in private schools the more protection
offered the public school system. Thus, an influx of students into the
public school system is clearly less effective from a fiscal point of view
than providing a financial boost to private schools.
The next issue under the O'Brien-Turner narrowly tailored test is
whether the means infringe on Establishment Clause concerns
substantially more than necessary. 348 The statute gave money to private
and religious schools based upon the number of school children. 349 It is
difficult to see how the proximity of this program to Establishment
Clause concerns (which doesn't appear to be all that great anyway) could
have been reduced without simply scrapping the program or monitoring
what was done with the money. Obviously, scrapping the program to
reduce the proximity is not required by the narrow tailoring requirement.
Monitoring is a possibility. Our views on monitoring and entanglement
have been repeatedly stated.
If the Education Opportunity program was to have a chance to work,
then it should be recognized that some way had to be devised to increase
private school enrollment. The grants and tax credits to the children's
parents would be much further removed from Establishment Clause
concerns than direct grants of money to the schools themselves. Thus it is
easy to state that the grants and tax credits did not brush against
Establishment Clause concerns substantially more than was necessary.
A case which the Court decided at the same time as Nyquist was
Levitt v. Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty. 350 In Levitt
the State of New York sought to reimburse non-public schools for
services rendered in order to comply with the State's mandatory testing
requirements. The funding was to reimburse for the Pupil Evaluation
Progress Test and other teacher prepared tests on subjects required to be

348. See supra note 70.
349. See Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 763-65.
350. 413 u.s. 472 (1973).
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taught under State law. 351 The Chapter contained language prohibiting the
school from using the funds for religious work or instruction. 352
The Court reviewed the case under the Lemon test with emphasis on
the Court's analysis in Nyquist. 353 Under the first Lemon test element,
secular purpose, the Court had no problem deciding that the statute was
for a secular purpose, reimbursement to the school for mandatory
testing. 354 However, the Court got hung-up on the primary effect the
funds had upon the establishment of religion. 355 The reasoning the Court
used was similar to Nyquist in that the school might use the funds for
religious purposes. 356 The Court thus held any direct aid to be a violation
of the Establishment Clause because it would have the primary effect of
advancing religion. 357
Similar to Nyquist, New York was merely supplementing certain
projects for a secular purpose. 358 The Chapter's purpose was secular, and
the Chapter was applied neutrally to non-public schools whether
religiously affiliated or not. The law was also neutral in the sense that it
had the effect of the State paying for all those categories of tests whether
administered in public or private school Thus, the law passed the
"neutrality" test. As to the first portion of the "incidental impact" test, the
state's purpose was clearly secular; whatever marginal advancement of
religion took place was clearly incidental to that purpose. It is probably
fair to say that the impact of this law on the advancement of religion was
far less than the impact the draft card law had on O'Brien's expressive
activity in burning the card. In addition, unlike Nyquist, New York was
directly reimbursing the non-public school for mandatory testing required
by the State. 359 The funds should have only an incidental effect on
religion since the tests are mandated whether the State reimbursed the
non-public schools or not. Therefore, the New York law would pass
constitutional muster under the "neutrality" test and pass the first part of
the 0 'Brien-Turner or "incidental impact" test.
In addition, based upon the O'Brien-Turner's requirement that the
means accomplish an important governmental purpose and be narrowly
tailored, New York's reimbursement for mandatory testing passes for
similar reasons as Nyquist. The purpose was to bring all schools to a
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minimum level of secular education excellence/60 surely an important
governmental purpose. Second, the means were narrowly tailored because
it would have been less effective for New York to handle the tests using
public school personnel. Exactly as in our analysis of Nyquist, the New
York law does not intrude substantially more than necessary into
Establishment Clause concerns. 361
The last major case within the funding of elementary and secondary
non-public schools is Meek v. Pittenger. 362 The case dealt with public
funding of non-public schools for various select programs. 363 The State's
purpose was to provide equal benefits to all children within the State. 364
The Supreme Court reviewed the statute under the Lemon three pronged
test.
Based upon the wording of the statute, the Supreme Court agreed the
statute passed the frrst prong of the Lemon test; it had a secular
purpose. 365 That purpose was to provide all children within the State
services equal to those received at public institutions. 366 Under our
"neutrality" test, the Supreme Court would have stopped its analysis at
this point.
Since the purpose was clearly secular, any advancement of religion
would be clearly incidental. There can be little doubt of the importance of
insuring that all school children benefit from the various programs at
issue. The law was clearly narrowly tailored because the benefits of these
programs would have been greatly reduced, if indeed they would have
existed at all without the State aid. Given the nature of the programs, 367 it

360. See id.
361. See supra note 349 and accompanying and subsequent text.
362. 421 u.s. 349 (1975).
363. See id. at 353-57. Pennsylvania set up various programs depending upon the Act. See
id. at 353-57. Under Act 194, the legislature authorized the State to supply "auxiliary services" to
students of non-public schools. !d. The services varied from counseling and testing to services for
exception and disadvantaged students. See id. at 352-53. Act 195 provided text books to students
and also provided the State the ability to loan other "instructional materials and equipment, useful
to the education of non-public school children." !d. at 354. The Court held that text book loan
programs did not violate the Establishment Clause based upon its reasoning in Board of Education
v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See Meek, 421 U.S. at 360. See supra pp. 17-19. The Acts required
the non-public institution to use the services and equipment for purely secular purposes and
mandated the institution comply with the State's compulsory attendance requirement. See id.
364. See Meek, 421 U.S. at 351-52.
365. See id at 363.
366. See id. See supra note 363 for list of services.
367. Act 194 authorizes the Commonwealth to provide "auxiliary services" to all children
enrolled in nonpublic elementary and secondary schools meeting Pennsylvania's compulsoryattendance requirements. "Auxiliary services" include counseling, testing, and psychological
services, speech and hearing therapy, teaching and related services for exceptional children, for
remedial students, and for the educationally disadvantaged, "and such other secular, neutral, nonideological services as are of benefit to nonpublic school children and are presently or hereafter
provided for public school children of the Commonwealth." Act 194 specifies that the teaching and
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should be clear that New York Law does not intrude substantially more
than necessary upon Establishment Clause concerns.
D. Acts of Government that Arguably Aid Religion
in Ways Other Than Financial
That some cases might satisfy one test but not the other is illustrated
by Stone v. Graham. 368 By law, Kentucky required "the posting of a copy
of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contributions, on the
wall of each public classroom in the State."369 The Supreme Court,
brushing aside the State's proffered purpose, 370 found that "the preeminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on schoolroom
walls is plainly religious in nature.'m 1 Thus the flrst element of the

services are to be provided in the non-public schools themselves by personnel drawn from the
appropriate "intermediate unit," part of the public school system of the Commonwealth established
to provide special services to local school districts. See PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 24 §§ 9-951 to 9-971
r.y.fest 1972).
Act 195 authorizes the State Secretary of Education, either directly or through the intermediate
units, to lend textbooks without charge to children attending nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools that meet the Commonwealth's compulsory-attendance requirements. The books that may
be lent are limited to those "which are acceptable for use in any public, elementary, or secondary
school of the Commonwealth." !d.
Act 19 5 also authorizes the Secretary of Education, pursuant to requests from the appropriate
nonpublic school officials, to lend directly to the nonpublic schools "instructional materials and
equipment, useful to the education" of nonpublic school children. "Instructional materials" are
defined to include periodicals, photographs, maps, charts, sound recordings, films, "or any other
printed and published materials of a similar nature." Instructional equipment," as defined by the
Act, includes projection equipment, recording equipment, and laboratory equipment. See PA. STAT.
ANN., tit. 24 §§ 9-951 to 9-971 r.y.fest 1972); See also Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-355.
368. 449 u.s. 39 (1980).
369. !d.
370. The Commonwealth insists that the statute in question serves a secular legislative
purpose, observing that the legislature required the following notation in small print at the bottom
of each display of the Ten Commandments: "The secular application of the Ten Commandment~
is clearly seen in its adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States." 1978 Ky. Acts, ch. 436, § 1 (effective June 17, 1978), KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 158.178 (Banks-Baldwin 1980). 449 U.S. at 41.
371. !d. at 41. This was so, said the Court, because "The Ten Commandments are undeniably
a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular
purpose can blind us to that fact." !d. The almost total malability of the Lemon test to suit the
Court's whims is illustrated by the following comment by then-Justice Rehnquist in dissent.
With no support beyond its own ipse dixit, the Court concludes that the Kentucky
statute involved in this case "has no secular legislative purpose," ante, at 193 (emphasis
supplied), and that "[t]he pre-eminent purpose for posting the Ten Commandments on
schoolroom walls is plainly religious in nature," ante, at 41. This even though, as the
trial court found, "[t]he General Assembly thought the statute had a secular legislative
purpose and specifically said so." App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. The Court's summary
rejection of a secular purpose articulated by the legislature and confirmed by the state
court is without precedent in Establishment Clause jurisprudence. Stone, 449 U.S. at 43
(Rehnquist, J ., dissenting).
The Chief Justice (Burger) and Justices Blackman and Stewart dissented from the Courts
"summary reversal" to which Justice Rehnquist refers in the portion of his dissent quoted above.

!d.

54

B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW

[Volume 12

Lemon test (no secular purpose) was found to be violated and the law was
a violation of the Establishment Clause. 372
Since this law cannot be said to be in a religiously neutral posture
because of the nature of the Ten Commandments, it apparently would not
fit the Smith neutrality test. 373 However, the O'Brien-Turner test is a
different matter. The posting of the Ten Commandments for the purpose
Kentucky put forward has nothing to do with religion. As illustrated by
the statement of purpose required to be affixed to the posted copies, "The
secular application of the Ten Commandments is clearly seen in its
adoption as the fundamental legal code of Western Civilization and the
Common Law of the United States."374 Even making allowances for the
"sellers puff" contained in the statement of purpose, this is a secular
purpose. However, it is a secular purpose achieved by means (the
posting) that has an incidental effect on Establishment Clause concerns.
As the Court pointed out, the Commandments are found in the Torah or
Old Testament and contain injunction, concerning the worship of God.
So, one must first ask if the purpose is important and would that purpose
as stated by Kentucky be achieved less effectively by not posting them. 375
The answer is obvious. However, does the law involve substantially more
Establishment Clause concerns than are necessary to achieve the
purpose?376 The answer is "no" because the Ten Commandments are a
unit. Divide them up and their force is diminished.
Engle v. Vitale 311 involved a prayer to be said in public schools.
Under Smith, the prayer is certainly not "a general law regarding
conduct" that is "not specifically directed at" the practice of religion. 378
Under the O'Brien-Turner test, we need do no more than examine the
purpose to see that the Regent's prayer would violate the Establishment
Clause. To paraphrase what the Court said in 0 'Brien, "the government
interest [purpose] is" not ''unrelated to" the practice of religion. 379
Therefore, the law in Engel would pass neither the Smith nor the

372. ld. at 42-43.
373. The Smith test appears, based on the only two examples available, to envision a law of
almost total neutrality. O'Brien, on the other hand lends itself to the situation where, although
perhaps not totally neutral, the act of government advancement of religion is, in truth, merely
incidental to the purpose the law sets out to achieve.
374. Stone, 449 U.S. at 41.
375. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
376. See id.
377. 370 U.S. 421 (1962). The New York State Board of Regents drafted the prayer involved
in this case and the Board of Education of Union Free School District Number 9 directed that the
prayer be recited at the beginning of each school day. ld. at 422-423. Arrangements were made
so that those who did not wish to participate would be "safeguard[ed)" against "embarrassments
and pressures." ld. at note 2.
378. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
379. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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0 'Brien-Turner incidental impact text. The law thus violates the
Establishment Clause.
The year after Engle the Court decided School District of Abington
Township v. Schempp and Murray v. Curlett together. 380 At issue in
Schempp was a Pennsylvania Statute381 which "require[d] 'At least ten
verses from the Holy Bible shall be read, without comment, at the
opening of each public school on each school day.' "382 The law also
required that "[a]ny child ... be excused from such Bible reading, or
attending such Bible reading, upon the written request of his parent or
guardian."383 At issue in Murray was a 1905 rule of the City of
Baltimore384 which "provided for the holding of opening exercises in the
schools of the city, consisting primarily of the 'reading, without
comment, of a chapter of the Holy Bible and/or the use of the Lord's
Prayer.' " 385 As with Engle 386 under Smith, the Bible reading is certainly
not "a general law regulating conduct" that is "not specifically directed
at" the practice of religion. 387 And, it would be impossible to say that "the
governmental interest [purpose] is unrelated to "the practice of
religion." 388 Exactly the same observations may be made regarding the
Bible reading and/or Lord's Prayer recitation which was involved in
Murray.
Wallace v. Jaffree 389 presents a public school prayer issue that is
much more difficult to resolve. In 1978 Alabama enacted a statute "which
authorized a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools 'for
meditation.' "390 In 1981 a similar second statute "authorized a period of
silence 'for meditation or voluntary prayer."'391 The constitutional
validity of the "for meditation" period of silence was upheld. 392 The
meditation and prayer statute was found to be unconstitutional primarily
based on the testimony of two people. State Senator Donald G. Holmes

380. 374 u.s. 203 (1963).
381. 24 PA. CONS. STAT. §15-1516, as amended, Pub. Law 1928 (Supp. 1960). ld. at 205.
382. ld.
383. Id.
384. ld. at 211. The rule was adopted "pursuant to Art. 77, Sec. 202 of the Annotated Code
of Maryland." Id.
385. ld.
386. See supra note 377.
387. See supra text at note 378.
388. Id.
389. 472 u.s. 38 (1985).
390. ld. at 40. The statute was ALA. CODE §16-1-20 (1978). [d.
391. ld. The statute was Al.A. CODE §16-1-20.1 (1978).
392. Id. at 41. A third Alabama statute, Al.A. CODE §16-1-20.2 (1978) which, "authorized
teachers to lead 'willing students' in a prescribed prayer to "Almighty God . . . the Creator and
Supreme Judge of the World", Id. at 40, was held to violate the Establishment Clause. Id. at 41.
Tills statute and its being ruled unconstitutional plays no part in this article.
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testified that he was the "prime sponsor" of . . . Sec. 16-1-20.1. He
explained that the bill was an effort to return voluntary prayer to our
public schools ... it is a beginning and a step in the right direction. " 393
Then the governor of Alabama "express[ly] admi[tted] . . . that the
enactment of Sec. 16-1-20.1 was intended to "clarify [the State's] intent to
have prayer as part of the daily classroom activity . . . " and that the
"expressed legislative purpose in enacting Section 16-1-20.1 ... " was to
"return voluntary prayer to the public schools."394
In the view of the majority of the Court, the frrst element of the
Lemon test was "dispositive." The State's purpose was totally
sectarian. 395
One must study the dissent of Chief Justice Burger to understand how
the 0 'Brien-Turner neutrality test would lead to a totally different view
of Sec. 16-1-20.1. Although his critique of the Court's use of statements
of a single legislator's [Holmes] motive to establish the collective
motivation of the Legislature is correct, 396 what is absolutely damning is
that the majority opinion ignored another of Mr. Holmes' statements.
"[T]he sponsor (Holmes) also testified that one of his purposes
[motives?] in drafting and sponsoring [16-1-20.1] was to clear up a
widespread misunderstanding that a schoolchild is legally prohibited
from engaging in silent, individual prayer once he steps inside a public
school building. " 397
Two can obviously play the game of substituting individual motive
for collective legislative purpose; thus, Chief Justice Burger pointed out
that "[t]hat testimony is at least as important as the statements the Court
relies upon, and surely that testimony manifests a permissible
purpose. " 398
Put in the simple terms of the 0 'Brien-Turner neutrality test, is there
a legislative purpose unrelated to a government sponsored religious
exercise where the means selected to achieve it creates merely an
incidental government involvement with religion? The answer, we
believe, is yes. In the words of Chief Justice Burger,

[Sec. 16-1-20.1] accommodates a purely private, voluntary
religious choices of individual pupils who wish to pray while at
the same time creating a time for nonreligious reflection for

393.
394.
395.
396.
confusion.
397.
398.

/d. at 43.
/d. at 57 n.44.
/d. at 53.
1be use of individual motive to determine the purpose of a legislative action is rife with
See the cases collected at West key number, STATUTES 216 in the various digests.
Wallace, 412 U.S. at 87.
/d.
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those who do not choose to pray. The statute also provides a
meaningful opportunity for schoolchildren to appreciate the
absolute constitutional right of each individual to worship or
believe as the individual wishes. 399

Admittedly, there is not here the total absence of relationship
between purpose and the incidental impact of means that one finds in
0 'Brien, 400 Glen Theatrei 01 or Smith. 402 To be sure, part of the purpose
has religious overtones and therefore the impact of the means on religion
is not totally incidental. Therefore we would not suggest that the Smith
approach of total First Amendment inapplicability is appropriate here.
However, the purposes appear to go sufficiently beyond the simple
endorsement of a religious practice to warrant the scrutiny under the
O'Brien-Turner test rather than the "ridiculous" (or bordering
thereupon) 403 voiding of the statute under the secular purpose prong of the
Lemon test. It would, however, be difficult to find the requisite Smith
neutrality.
To apply the remainder of the 0 'Brien-Turner test, one first asks
whether the purpose of the law is important. We do not believe it is
beyond reason to suggest that clarifying any misunderstanding as to
whether the statute's moment of silence could be used for prayer, 404
together with Chief Justice Burger's observation regarding the
appreciation of the constitutional lesson of religious toleration, 405 is
sufficiently important. Under 0 'Brien-Turner, the relationship of means
to purpose must be such that the purpose would be achieved less
effectively some other way. Certainly, since this efficacy of means test
does not require a search for less drastic alternatives, it is fair to say that
there is no other way to insure in the minds of children that a moment of
silence includes the right to pray as well as meditate other than to say so.
That is what the statute does, that and no more. Therefore it does not
intrude substantially more than is necessary into Establishment Clause
concerns. As to the lesson about religious toleration, actual practice is
worth more than all the words in the world. We believe that the statute
should not have been struck down under Lemon but upheld under
0 'Brien-Turner. That is the true neutrality toward religion to which the
majority opinion merely pays lip service.

ld. at 89.
See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 80-84 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
Wallace, 412 U.S. at 89.
404. ld. at 87.
405. Jd. at 89.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
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Edwards v. Aguillard, 406 which involved a law that required that the
theory of evolution and the theory of creation science be taught in tandem
or not at all, appears at frrst blush to be a very clear example of a
legislative purpose that has everything to do with the promotion of
religion in the public schools and nothing to do with neutrality. Viewed
that way, it could never survive either the O'Brien-Turner test or the
Smith test. However once it is realized, as pointed out by the dissent of
Justice Scalia, that a powerful secular purpose did exist and that its affect
on any Establishment Clause concerns were merely incidental, O'BrienTurner can easily be applied.
The crux of the case for the law being directed at something other
than religion and merely having an incidental effect upon religion is
found in the following summation by Justice Scalia of the testimony of
the bill's sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, and those whom the Senator called
to testify. We have edited it for the purpose of this article.
There are only two scientific explanations for the beginning of
life - evolution and creation science. Both posit a theory of the
origin of life and subject that theory to empirical testing. The
body of scientific evidence supporting creation science is as
strong as that supporting evolution. Creation science is
educationally valuable because students exposed to it better
understand the current state of scientific evidence about the
origin of life. Creation science can and should be presented to
children without any religious content. The censorship of
creation science has at least two harmful effects. First, it
deprives students of one of the two scientific explanations for
the origin of life and leads them to believe that evolution is
proven fact; thus their education suffers and they are wrongly
taught that science has proved their religious beliefs false. 407

As Justice Scalia noted, it is not necessary to "endorse the accuracy"
of the testimony which we have set out above. That, he correctly felt, was
beside the point:
Our task is not to judge the debate about teaching the origins
of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana
Legislature believed. The vast majority of them voted to
approve a bill which explicitly stated a secular purpose; what
is crucial is not their wisdom in believing that purpose would

406. 482 u.s. 578 (1987).
407. Id. at 619-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citations ommitted).
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be achieved by the bill, but their sincerity in believing it would
be.4os
If one assumes that a balanced teaching of the two theories of
creation does not focus on religion, then the effect of the law in ensuring
that the flaws in the teaching of evolution alone (the fact that a child is
not taught that his or her religious beliefs have been disproven by
science) is merely an incidental treatment of religion.
The application of the 0 'Brien-Turner balancing test appears to be
easily satisfied. It is clearly an important purpose for both scientific
theories to be taught in the interest of "academic freedom" as that phrase
was understood by the Louisiana Legislature. The means, teaching both
theories, is clearly "narrowly tailored" in the sense of the purpose being
achieved less effectively by some other means. There are no other means.
And for that reason substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns
are involved than are necessary.
Marsh v. Chambers409 presents a situation that must be treated apart
from the simple application of the two tests we have been applying. 410 At
issue was the practice of a State legislature employing a chaplain and
opening each legislative session with a prayer. 411 Just as such a practice
could not survive even a reasonable application412 of the Lemon test,
neither can it survive either of our proposed tests. It is not a neutral
practice that merely has religious implications as in our version of
Smith, 413 nor is it a non-religious purpose whose achievement has an
indirect and unintended effect on Establishment Clause concerns as in
our version of O'Brien-Turner. 414 This is simply a form of religious
endorsement, thus it is not neutral in regard to Establishment Clause
concerns. However, in Marsh the Court refused to apply Lemon and
upheld the practice as one rooted in history415 and not posing any real
threat to Establishment Clause concerns. 416 The same must be done here
with the two neutrality tests.

408. !d. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
409. 463 u.s. 783 (1983).
410. See supra notes 53-68, 71-78 and accompanying text.
411. 463 U.S. at 785-86.
412. See supra note 10.
413. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
415. 463 U.S. at 786-91. Although "standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify
contempa:ary violations of constitutional guarantees.... (!d. at 790) the Court found that "the unique
history leads us to accept the interpretations of the First Amendment drafts men who saw no real
threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now
challenged." !d. at 791.
416. !d. at 791-92.
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Edwards v. Aguillard, 406 which involved a law that required that the
theory of evolution and the theory of creation science be taught in tandem
or not at all, appears at frrst blush to be a very clear example of a
legislative purpose that has everything to do with the promotion of
religion in the public schools and nothing to do with neutrality. Viewed
that way, it could never survive either the O'Brien-Turner test or the
Smith test. However once it is realized, as pointed out by the dissent of
Justice Scalia, that a powerful secular purpose did exist and that its affect
on any Establishment Clause concerns were merely incidental, 0 'BrienTurner can easily be applied.
The crux of the case for the law being directed at something other
than religion and merely having an incidental effect upon religion is
found in the following summation by Justice Scalia of the testimony of
the bill's sponsor, Senator Bill Keith, and those whom the Senator called
to testify. We have edited it for the purpose of this article.
There are only two scientific explanations for the beginning of
life- evolution and creation science. Both posit a theory of the
origin of life and subject that theory to empirical testing. The
body of scientific evidence supporting creation science is as
strong as that supporting evolution. Creation science is
educationally valuable because students exposed to it better
understand the current state of scientific evidence about the
origin of life. Creation science can and should be presented to
children without any religious content. The censorship of
creation science has at least two harmful effects. First, it
deprives students of one of the two scientific explanations for
the origin of life and leads them to believe that evolution is
proven fact; thus their education suffers and they are wrongly
taught that science has proved their religious beliefs false. 407

As Justice Scalia noted, it is not necessary to "endorse the accuracy"
of the testimony which we have set out above. That, he correctly felt, was
beside the point:
Our task is not to judge the debate about teaching the origins
of life, but to ascertain what the members of the Louisiana
Legislature believed. The vast majority of them voted to
approve a bill which explicitly stated a secular purpose; what
is crucial is not their wisdom in believing that purpose would

406. 482 u.s. 578 (1987).
407. /d. at 619-29 (Scalia, J., dissenting)(citations orrnnitted).
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be achieved by the bill, but their sincerity in believing it would
be.4os
If one assumes that a balanced teaching of the two theories of
creation does not focus on religion, then the effect of the law in ensuring
that the flaws in the teaching of evolution alone (the fact that a child is
not taught that his or her religious beliefs have been disproven by
science) is merely an incidental treatment of religion.
The application of the 0 'Brien-Turner balancing test appears to be
easily satisfied. It is clearly an important purpose for both scientific
theories to be taught in the interest of "academic freedom" as that phrase
was understood by the Louisiana Legislature. The means, teaching both
theories, is clearly "narrowly tailored" in the sense of the purpose being
achieved less effectively by some other means. There are no other means.
And for that reason substantially no more Establishment Clause concerns
are involved than are necessary.
Marsh v. Chambers409 presents a situation that must be treated apart
from the simple application of the two tests we have been applying. 410 At
issue was the practice of a State legislature employing a chaplain and
opening each legislative session with a prayer. 411 Just as such a practice
could not survive even a reasonable application412 of the Lemon test,
neither can it survive either of our proposed tests. It is not a neutral
practice that merely has religious implications as in our version of
Smith, 413 nor is it a non-religious purpose whose achievement has an
indirect and unintended effect on Establishment Clause concerns as in
our version of O'Brien-Tumer. 414 This is simply a form of religious
endorsement, thus it is not neutral in regard to Establishment Clause
concerns. However, in Marsh the Court refused to apply Lemon and
upheld the practice as one rooted in history415 and not posing any real
threat to Establishment Clause concerns. 416 The same must be done here
with the two neutrality tests.

408. !d. at 621 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
409. 463 u.s. 783 (1983).
410. See supra notes 53-68, 71-78 and accompanying text.
411. 463 U.S. at 785-86.
412. See supra note 10.
413. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
414. See supra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
415. 463 U.S. at 786-91. Although "standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify
contenp:rary violations of constitutional guarantees.... (!d. at 790) the Court found that "the unique
history leads us to accept the interpretations of the First Amendment drafts men who saw no real
threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now
challenged." !d. at 791.
416. !d. at 791-92.
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The next area deals with public displays of religiously affiliated
holiday decorations. The two cases which deal with this activity are
Lynch v. Donnell/ 11 and County of Allegheny v. A.C.L.U. 418 In both
cases, the Court again showed the inconsistencies and varied results the
Lemon test can create with similar facts. The Court struggled with both
the intent and primary effect of allowing a government to display
religiously affiliated decorations during a holiday period.
In Lynch, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island erected a Christmas
display every holiday season. 419 The display was located in a park, owned
by a non-profit organization, in the heart of Pawtucket. 420 Pawtucket's
city government, along with the downtown merchants erected the display,
which consisted of various Christmas type items 421 and a creche. 422 The
Court also noted the creche originally cost the city $1,365 but was
currently worth only $200, and the city spent about $20 per year erecting
and dismantling the creche. 423 The respondents brought this action
because they believed the creche display violated the Establishment
Clause. 424
The Court began its analysis under the Lemon test but noted within
the first paragraph of the analysis that "total separation [of church and
state] is not possible in an absolute sense. 425 Some relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable."426 Additionally, the
Court started to tear down the "wall" of separation. 427 Then the Court
went through a litany (so to speak) of examples where the government
and religion act together or the separation of church and state doctrine is
blurred. 428

417. 465 u.s. 668 (1984).
418. 492 u.s. 573 (1989).
419. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
420. See id.
421. The items included "[a) Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa's sleigh, candystripped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, ... , a large banner that reads 'Seasons Greetings.' " !d.
422. See id. A creme is the Christian representation of the birth of Christ which normally
consists of Christ, a manger, Mother Mary, Joseph, three wise men, and various villagers and farm
animals.
423. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
424. !d.
425. !d. at 672.
426. See id.
427. See id. The Court notes that "the metaphor itself is not a wholly accurate description
of the practical aspects of the relationship that in fact exists between church and state." !d.
428. The Court noted the history of religion within the United States and its influence on
government. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 675-76. Some of the examples the Court gave were Washington's
Thanksgiving proclamation based upon religious overtones and the "Executive Orders and other
official announcements of Presidents and of Congress have proclaimed both Christmas and
Thanksgiving National Holidays in religious terms. See id.
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In the Court's review of the current problem, the Lemon test elements
of secular purpose and primary effect were of the greatest concern. 429
Pawtucket's stated purpose was based upon the whole display, not just
the creche, and was simply to have a Christmas display. 430 The Court
stated that a city sponsoring a display to celebrate a holiday was a
legitimate secular purpose. 431 Thus, the display passed the first element of
the Lemon test.
Second, the district court had held that the creche had the primary
effect of benefitting the Christian religion in particular. 432 The Court
noted that there might be some incidental benefit, but the benefit was
surely less than previously allowed benefits, as in Board of Education v.
Allen433 and Roemer v. Board of Public Works. 434 For the final element,
entanglement, the Court merely used a kind and degree analysis. 435 The
Court stated the value of the creche and the maintenance and set-up costs
were de minimis. 436 Therefore, the Court held that the creche display did
not violate any of the Lemon test elements and did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
The two tests established within this article are closely related to the
analysis the Court used in Lynch. First, the Smith "neutrality" test would
simply look to see if the display was neutrally established. 437 Pawtucket
merely wished to celebrate the holiday, a legitimate legislative purpose. 438
In addition, the display had no more than an incidental impact on
religion, as the Court stated previously. 439 Thus, the display passed the
Smith test and the first portion of the 0 'Brien-Turner test.
The O'Brien-Turner test's first balancing of interests element
requires that the legislative purpose be important which can hardly be
disputed. The second element, narrowly tailored, is somewhat harder to
explain. However, the two basic underpinnings of narrowly tailored,
would lead to the inclusion of the creche in the overall holiday display
being upheld. A Christmas display is simply less effective without the
creche. As secular as many aspects of the holiday have become, it still is

429. See id. at 680.
430. See id. at 681.
431. See id.
432. See id.
433. 392 U.S. 236 (1968). See supra notes 185-99 and accompanying text at that point for
our discussion of Allen.
434. 426 U.S. 736 (1976). See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681. See also supra notes 126-55 for our
discussion of Roemer.
435. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.
436. See id.
437. See supra notes 71-78 for an explanation of the "neutrality'' test.
438. See Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681.
439. See id. at 685.
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related to the birth of Christ. Second, since the creche is but one part of a
display containing a number of secular symbols of the holiday, the creche
does not conflict with First Amendment concerns substantially more than
necessary. Even the Court noted that any benefit or infringement on a
constitutional area was incidental. 440 Therefore, the display would pass
both the Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests.
The next display case, County of Allegheny v. A. C.L. U. ,441 dealt with
a creche display placed within the County Courthouse and a menorah
placed outside the City-County building. 442 The Court began its review
with a history of both the creche and the menorah. 443 Both symbols relate
to religious holidays, Christmas and Chanukah, but the Court went one
step further with the menorah and stated the Israeli Jews do not place as
much emphasis on the menorah as the American Jews do. 444
Based upon the historic, cultural and present meaning of the symbols,
the Court initiated its analysis under the Lemon test elements. First the
Court reviewed the creche445 under both the secular purpose and primary
effect elements of Lemon. The Court differentiated the creche from the
Lynch creche because of its prominence in the display area. In addition,
the Court noted this creche had a sign stating "Glory to God in the
Highest."446 As in Lynch, the Court observed that having a Christmas
display is a legitimate legislative secular activity. 447 But, the Court held
that the display's primary effect was the advancement of religion, mainly
the Christian faith. 448 Therefore, the creche violated the Establishment
Clause.
Achieving a different result under the Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests
may not be possible, certainly not under Smith anyway. The display of the
creche is simply not the neutral application of a law that is equally
applicable to all. Therefore, application of our version of the Smith
neutrality test would lead to the same result that the Court reached under
Lemon.
The 0 'Brien-Turner test presents greater possibilities, but only if the
existence of a purpose unrelated to religion can be identified. It is
admittedly a stretch, but that purpose might be simply the celebration of
what is, after all, a national holiday. If this definition of the government's

440. See id. at 681-83.
441. 492 u.s. 573 (1989).
442. See id. at 578.
443. See id. at 578-87.
444. See id. at 586-87. The cultural celebration differences between the creche and the
menorah become important later in the Court's analysis. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
445. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 594.
446. See id. at 598.
447. See generally Lynch, 465 U.S. 668. See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598-602.
448. See 492 U.S. at 598-602.
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purpose can be sustained, then it is possible to argue that the effect of the
creche on Establishment Clause concerns is merely indirect or incidental.
Then, if the above analysis holds up, the placement of the creche could
probably be upheld. Celebrating a national holiday is obviously an
important purpose. The first element of narrow tailoring is met for the
same reason as Lynch. 449 When one arrives at the second element,
however, problems arise. Arguably there is substantially more intrusion
into interests protected by the Establishment Clause than is necessary
because of the availability of a Lynch type holiday display. On the other
hand, this appears to be simply a search for a less drastic means which is
emphatically not part of this test. Therefore it is possible to argue, even if
not with great confidence, that the nature of the holiday being what it is,
the creche is not substantially a greater intrusion than necessary into
Establishment Clause concerns.
The Court created the fiction that the menorah is more than strictly a
religious symbol, being also secular in nature and then used the elements
of the Lemon test to prove a menorah does not violate the Establishment
Clause. 450 This fiction could also have been carried to the creche because
mangers were used often in the pre-Christian days. However, the Court
also noted that the menorah was beside a Christmas tree and a Statue of
Liberty. 451 Thus the display did not portray a singly religious message. 452
Based upon the same reasoning as Lynch, the Court held that the menorah
did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would go through the same type
of analysis with the menorah as with the creche in Lynch.
The next major area of non-financial cases surround the Federal Civil
Rights legislation and its effect on religious institutions. One of the
current and major cases dealing with Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 is Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints v. Amos. 453 The case
involved an employee who was discharged from his duties at a non-profit
facility run by the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints (otherwise
known as "Mormons"). 454 The Church discharged the employee because
of a requirement that the employee must be a member of the Church in
good standing. 455 The employee brought suit under the Civil Rights Act
stating that the §702 religious exemption to the Civil Rights Act was

449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.
455.

See
See
See
See
483
See
See

supra text at the second and third sentence before note 435.
County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613-15.
id. at 613-16.
id.
U.S. 327 (1987).
id.
id. at 330-31.
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unconstitutional because the section violated the Establishment Clause. 456
The Church countered stating that §702 did not violate the Establishment
Clause.
The Court reviewed the statute using the Lemon test's three elements:
intent, primary effect and entanglement. 457 The frrst element, intent, the
Court discounted by reasoning that the legislature was trying "to alleviate
significant governmental interference with the ability of religious
organizations to define and carry out their religious missions." 458 Thus,
the Court found the legislative intent was secular, and the first Lemon test
element was met.
The second element, primary effect, was slightly harder for the Court
to analyze. The Court dropped back to a defensive position stating that
some laws benefit religion, 459 and the Court noted that these laws will
have the effect of benefitting religion, but the benefit is incidental. 460 In
addition, since the nonprofit facility was a gymnasium, the Court could
not fathom how a gymnasium could promote religion. 461 Therefore, the
religious exemption under the 1964 Civil Rights Act did not have the
primary effect of advancing or establishing religion. The Court did not
analyze the entanglement element because §702 did not involve any
government interference with religion. The statute was written to prevent
this from happening. 462 Thus, the Court held the exemption for the 1964
Civil Rights Act did not violate the Establishment Clause.
The Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would arrive at the same
conclusion but through a more logical analysis. First, the Smith test
requires the law to be neutrally applied to all. 463 In the current case, the
exemption, §702, applies equally to all religious institutions' se-eular
activities. In addition, the effect of the statute must not have more than an
incidental effect on religion. In the current case, the Court even stated
§702 does not have more than an incidental effect on religion because the
purpose was to keep government out of religion. 464 Therefore, the
exemption passed both the Smith test and the first portion of the 0 'BrienTurner test.

456. See id. at 331.
457. See Church of Jesus Christ Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 334-35.
458. See id. at 335.
459. The Court specifically notes the property tax exemptions of Waltz v. Tax Commissioner
and the school book loans upheld in Board of Education v. Allen. See Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 336-37 (citations omitted).
460. See id.
461. See id.
462. See generally Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, 483 U.S. at 339.
463. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
464. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-38.
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The 0 'Brien-Turner test also requires that the means used to
accomplish the legislative purpose be narrowly tailored. The Court gave
the reasons the legislation was necessary: to prevent government
interference in a religious organization's practices, which is clearly an
important purpose. 465 The government could not separate itself from
interfering with religion if the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied equally to
all employers. The government would be forced to interfere in the
religions hiring practices and thereby get the government entangled with
religion. 466 This resembles the "Catch 22" argument. 467 Therefore, the
1964 Civil Rights Act might not have passed the Lemon test without the
exemption supplied through §702.
The means was narrowly tailored because without the exemption the
legislative purpose could not have been met. In addition, the exemption
had no more than incidental effect on any constitutionally protected area.
The exemption did benefit religion, but as the Court pointed out, §702 did
not have any greater benefit on religion than what the Court had
previously held did not violate the Establishment Clause. 468 Therefore,
the religious organization's exemption from the 1964 Civil Rights Act
passed both the Smith, O-Brien-Turner, and Lemon tests with the first
two supplying a superior analysis of why the exemption did not violate
the Establishment Clause.
The question of government's delegation of power to an individual or
group has also entered into the Establishment Clause arena. In Larkin v.
Grendel's Den, the State of Massachusetts created a statute which gave
churches and schools the right to veto a liquor sales license if the
establishment was within 500 feet of the church or school. 469 The suit
started when the Holy Cross Church objected/vetoed a liquor license
application by Grendel's Den. 470 The church's only reason for vetoing the
application was because there were already so many liquor
establishments within the area. 471 The Court reviewed the statute's
constitutionality under the previously mentioned Lemon test's three
elements: secular purpose, effect on religion and entanglement. 472

465.
466.
467.
468.
469.
4 70.
471.
472.

See
Id.
See
See
See
See
See
See

infra text at note 471.
supra note 23.
Amos, 483 U.S. at 336-337.
id. at 117. The statute was MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.138 §16C (1974).
id. at 118.
id.
id. at 123.
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The Court acknowledged that protecting churches and educational
institutions from the clientele of liquor establishments is a secular
purpose. 473 Thus, the statute passed the first element of the Lemon test.
The second element of the Lemon test, effect on religion, caused the
Court to analyze the effect the veto power had on the establishment of
religion. The Court found the statute allowed a church to veto a liquor
license without reason or cause. 474 The Court then went through an
analysis of how a church may misuse the veto power. 475 The Court states
that "the potential for conflict inheres in the situation. "476 After the
analysis, the Court noted the benefit a church would gain from the veto
power, an appearance of a joint government/church legislative power. 477
The Court noted that the church and government were also entangled
because of the joint process in the liquor application
process-government application and church veto power. 478 Therefore,
the Court held that the statute violated the second element and third
element, beneficial primary effect on religion, and entanglement.
The Smith "neutrality" test and the 0 Brien-Turner "incidental
impact" test would arrive at the same conclusion the court did, violation
of the Establishment Clause. The first step in the "neutrality" test is that
the statute must be applied equally to all. In Larkin, the churches and
schools had an unlimited right to veto any liquor license within 500 feet
of the institution. 479 The statute did not allow others, such as museums or
day care centers, to veto the liquor license even though these type
institutions would also fall under the Court's stated purpose of the statute.
Therefore, the statute does not neutrally apply to all and would fail the
Smith test. The statute would also have more than an incidental effect on
religion. As the Court noted, the veto power gives the church a legislative
power. The statute was not neutral; it had more than an incidental effect
on religion because the church was performing a governmental task.
Therefore, the statute failed the Smith test and violated the Establishment
Clause.
The statute also violates the first portion of the 0 Brien-Turner test.
In addition, the 0 Brien-Turner test would require the method selected to
accomplish the purpose be the least intrusive on a constitutionally
1

1

1

473. See id. at 123-24. In the Court's words the reasons for MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.138 §16C
was to "protect spiritual, cultural, and educational centers from the 'hurly-burly' associated with
liquor outlets." Larkin, 459 U.S. at 123.
474. See Larkin, 459 U.S. at 125-26.
475. See id. at 126-27.
476. /d. at 125.
477. See id. at 125-27.
478. See id. at 126-27.
479. /d. at 117.
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protected area. In Larkin, the legislature sought to keep liquor
establishments away from schools and churches and accomplished this
goal by allowing churches or schools to veto liquor license
applications. 480 However, the legislature could have simply required
liquor establishments to be at least 500 feet from schools or churches.
There was a method which would infringe even less on a constitutionally
protected area than the method chosen, the veto power. The statute fails
both portions of the 0 'Brien-Turner test also. Thus, the Lemon and the
proposed Smith and 0 'Brien-Turner tests would all arrive at the same
conclusion in Larkin.
The Establishment Clause also involves the actual usage of a public
building for religious activities. In Board of Education of the Westside
Community Schools v. Mergens, 481 the Court reviewed a case involving a
student Christian club's right to hold meetings on school property. The
School Board created an Act which provided a limited open forum for the
students to associate after school on certain activities. 482 The school
thought that since the Christian club 483 was affiliated with religion, to
allow the students to hold meetings on the school property would violate
the Establishment Clause. 484 The Court then had to decide whether the
school clubs at Westside High School were protected by the limited open
forum rule of the Equal Access Act, which was designed to extend the
Court decision of Widmar v. Vincent to public secondary schools 485 • It
held that they were, and thus the Christian Club could not be denied
access available to other clubs at the School. 486 The Court again reviewed
the Act under the Lemon test. 487
The Court noted that the Act's purpose was secular. 488 In addition,
the Court compared this Act with the "equal access" policies in
Widmar489 where the Court had stated these types of Acts or policies do
not violate the Establishment Clause. 490

480. See id. at 118.
481. 496 u.s. 226 (1990).
482. See id. at 226-27. The group activities were such things as, scuba, chess and "clubs and
organizations shall not be sponsored by any political or religious organization, or by any
organization which denies membership on the basis of race, color, creed, sex or political belief."
!d. at 232.
483. See id. at 232.
484. See id. at 232-33.
485. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263.
486. See Mergens, 496 U.S. at 234-47.
487. See id. at 234.
488. See id. at 235.
489. 454 U.S. at 271-74.
490. Mergens, 496 U.S. at 247-53 (opinion by O'Connor, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., White
and Blaclcmun, Jj.).
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Under the Smith and O'Brien-Turner tests the results would have
been the same. Under Smith, the Act must be neutrally applied with no
more than an incidental effect on religion. First, in Mergens, the Act was
applied equally to all students. Second, the Act did not affect religion
because the Act specifically excluded religion. Therefore, under the
Smith test the Establishment Clause would not even apply.
In the O'Brien-Turner test, the first portion passed because the Act
was directed at equal access to limited open forums and any impact of
that on Establishment Clause concerns is indeed incidental. The draft
card law in O'Brien is equivalent to the Equal Access Act here. The
incidental impact of the draft card law on O'Brien's expressive act of
burning his draft card equals the Equal Access Act's opening up public
school property to a religious club. The second portion of the O'BrienTurner test requires that the purpose be important. It would be difficult to
argue that it wasn't. The two components of narrowly tailored means are
also satisfied. The purpose of Equal Access would be achieved less
effectively if access was unequally based upon religious grounds. It is
that very point that satisfies the second element of narrow tailoring-not
substantially greater intrusion into Establishment Clause interests than
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the Act. Thus, under the 0' Brienrumer test, the Equal Access Law does not violate the Establishment
Clause.
CONCLUSION
This conclusion will consist of three parts. The frrst is the simplest.
We did not cover every Supreme Court Establishment Clause case
because it would have generally been redundant and could have made a
long manuscript even longer.
Second, we must recognize Agostini v. Felton 491 which overruled
Aguilar v. Felton, 492 one of the cases discussed in this manuscript. 493
Agostini was decided by the Supreme Court after the discussion of those
cases herein had already been written. Since Agostini would not change
our approach to Aguilar and, indeed, to some modest extent takes the
Court in the direction of our approach, it was decided to deal with
Agostini in the conclusion. Initially, however, it is important to note that
the Court rejected the idea that, in Agostini, it had greatly modified its
Establishment Clause analysis:

491. _ U . S . _ (1997), 117 S.Ct. 1997 (1997).
492. 473 U.S. 402 (1982). See supra notes 258-74 and accompanying text. Agostini also
overruled part of the Courts earlier holding in School District of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S.
373 (1982). See Agostini_ U.S._ at _ _ , 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
493. See supra notes 258-76 and accompanying text.
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Our more recent cases have undermined the assumptions
upon which Ball and Aguilar relied. To be sure, the general
principles we use to evaluate whether government aid violates
the Establishment Clause have not changed since Aguilar was
decided. For example, we continue to ask whether the
government acted with the purpose of advancing or inhibiting
religion, and the nature of that inquiry has remained largely
unchanged. See Witters, 474 U.S., at 485-486; Bowen v.
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 602-604 (1988) (concluding that
Adolescent Family Life Act had a secular purpose); Board of
Ed. of Westside Community Schools (Dist. 66) v. Mergens, 496
U.S. 226, 248-249 (1990) (concluding that Equal Access [*37]
Act has a secular purpose); cf Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S.
578 (1987) (striking down Louisiana law that required
creationism to be discussed with evolution in public schools
because the law lacked a legitimate secular purpose).
Likewise, we continue to explore whether the aid has the
"effect" of advancing or inhibiting religion. What has changed
since we decided Ball and Aguilar is our understanding of the
criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an
impermissible effect. 494
The changes in the Court's outlook that lead it to overrule Aguilar and
modify Ball were set out by the Court.
First, the Court has "abandoned the presumption erected in Meek and
Ball that the placement of public employees on parochial school grounds
inevitably results in the impermissible effect of state-sponsored
indoctrination or constitutes a symbolic union between government and
religion. " 495
Second, the Court

departed from the rule relied on in Ball that all government
aid that directly aids the educational function of religious
schools is invalid. In Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), we held that the Establishment
Clause did not bar a State from issuing a vocational tuition
grant to a blind person who wishes to use the grant to attend
a Christian college and become a pastor, missionary, or youth
director. Even though the grant recipient clearly would use
the money to obtain religious education, we observed that the

494. 117 S. Ct. at 2010.
495. !d. at 2010. Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, is cited by the
Court for this proposition and can clearly be so read. See supra text at notes 229-41 for discussion
of the Supreme Court's opinion in Zobrest.
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tuition grants were "made available generally without regard
to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of
the institution benefitted." I d., at 487 (quoting Committee for
Public Ed. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 782783, n.38 (1973)). The grants were disbursed directly to
students, who then used the money to pay for tuition at the
educational institution of their choice. In our view, this
transaction was no different from a State's issuing a paycheck
to one of its employees, knowing that the employee would
donate part or all of the check to a religious institution. In
both situations, any money that ultimately went to religious
institutions did so "only as a result of the genuinely
independent and private choices of" individuals. Ibid. The
same logic applied in Zobrest, where we allowed the State to
provide an interpreter, even though she would be a
mouthpiece for religious instruction, because the IDEA's
neutral eligibility criteria ensured that the interpreter's
presence in a sectarian school was a "result of the private
decision of individual parents" and "[could] not be attributed
to state decisionmaking." 509 U.S., at 10 (emphasis added).
Because the private school would not have provided an
interpreter on its own, we also concluded that the aid in
Zobrest did not directly finance religious education by
"reliev[ing] the sectarian school[] of costs [it] otherwise would
have borne in educating [its] students."496
Third, although as the Agostino Court admitted that case is not
anything like a full retreat from Lemon,491 it is a beginning. We believe
that either of our proposed alternatives to Lemon would continue to
improve the process. 498 To select the Smith neutrality approach is
tempting not in the least because of its simplicity. A law that serves a
neutral purpose, having nothing directly to do with advancing religion,
simply does not involve an establishment of religion. Perhaps those who
wrote the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment and those who
voted for its ratification would have felt that the Smith test would have
prevented such an establishment as they understood it. However, much
has happened since then to complicate matters. The Establishment Clause
now applies to the States, having been "selectively" incorporated into the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. More important than
that, perhaps, the interpretation of the Clause fell into the hands of a

496. 117 S.Ct at 2011-12.
497. See supra text at note 495.
498. See supra notes 52-70 and 71-78 and accompanying text.
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transcendent Supreme Court majority whose determination to guard
Jeffersons "wall of separation" can, it seems to us, be described as
zealous if not fanatical. The needs of little children in schools with a
religious affiliation were sacrificed in the name of Jefferson's wall.
Regrettably then, the work of the zealots requires an approach that can
remove the offending bricks in that wall in a more careful way than the
rather broad brush approach of the Smith test.
Thus we think the Establishment Clause version of the O'BrienTurner incidental impact test, with its recognition that there are interests
that should prevail over what can be described as marginal Establishment
Clause concerns, can do. Consider again the precision it employs. First,
government must not set out with the goal of simply advancing religion,
one belief or all. It must have its sights set on achieving some other goal
so that if in the advancement of that goal, religion is also advanced, it is
truly incidental. Then, even to justify that incidental advancement,
government's non-religious purpose must be an important one. Beyond
that, the means used to achieve it (and that have the incidental effect on
religion) must be narrowly tailored. This requires that the non religious
purpose would be achieved less effectively using other means (means that
presumably would not have the incidental effect on religion). Even that is
not enough, however, because the incidental effect on religion must not
be substantially more than necessary to achieve the non-religious
purpose.
As we believe has been demonstrated in this article, while the
application of this approach probably won't take us back to original
intent, it presents a way to achieve a much more realistic application of
the Establishment Clause.

